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   SUMMARY 
 
One of the recognised ways through which a firm may increase its market share or 
reorganise its presence in a market is through a merger. A merger occurs when 
independent firms combine their businesses. Section 12A of the Competition Act, 
1998, provides two grounds in terms of which mergers must be evaluated by 
competition authorities. These are competition and public interest considerations. 
The Act is reticent on which, between the two considerations, should take 
precedence in the event that the two conflict. The anterior purpose of this study is 
therefore to provide an in-depth analysis on which consideration must take 
precedence in the event of conflict. On analysis, the majority of case law suggests 
that the competition considerations must take precedence. This observation is also 
buttressed by a significant amount of literature, which holds that in merger analysis, 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Introduction  
  
Competition law is mainly concerned with the regulation of competition amongst 
firms competing in the same market. Among the conduct or practices regulated by 
competition law are, inter alia, pricing, market allocation, abuse of dominance 
conduct, and merger regulation. The latter is the focus of this study. Although some 
observers consider mergers to bear the least economic consequences,1 there is 
consensus that merger activity deserves the full attention of competition authorities.  
As the former chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, David Lewis, aptly observes: 
“[m]erger regulation is substantively important because of the long-term impact that 
these combinations, the most powerful and permanent form of inter-firm cooperation, 
may have on the structure of markets.”2  
 
The legal as well as economic concern of mergers is that they may result in single-
firm dominance which in turn may result in unilateral abusive conduct or augment the 
potential for anti-competitive horizontal agreements.3 Another likely consequence of 
a merger is that the merged entity may have incentives to exercise market power, 
with the potential to harm competition.4 Kelly and others submit that mergers may 
result in either unilateral effects, where the merged entity is able to increase prices or 
output unilaterally; or co-ordinated effects, where post-merger there will be fewer 
firms competing in the markets and this is likely to lead competitors to co-ordinate 
their conduct.5  Competition may be vexed if any of the risks and consequences of 
mergers were to occur. Thus, it is for this reason that merger regulation forms an 
integral part of competition law. 
                                            
1 Lewis D Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (Edward Elgar 
2013) 70-71. 
2 Ibid at 71.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Coppola M “Consideration of Public Interest Factors in Antitrust Merger Control” Competition Policy 
International 24 March 2015, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/consideration-of-public-interest-factors-inantitrust-
merger-control/, accessed on 24 March 2019.  
5 Kelly L, Unterhalter D, Goodman I, Smith P, & Youens P Principles of Competition Law in South 
Africa (Oxford, 2017) 171. 
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However, merger regulation is not a precise science, especially in South Africa. The 
Competition Act6 (henceforth “the Act”), enjoins competition authorities, when 
considering a merger, initially to determine whether or not a merger is likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition.7 This, the competition authorities must 
do, by assessing factors listed in section 12A(2) of the Act. If it appears that the 
merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition, the authorities must determine 
whether or not the merger is likely to result in any technological, efficiency, or other 
pro-competitive gains.8 Secondly, the authorities must further determine whether the 
merger can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds,9 notwithstanding the 
competition determination. However, the Act is reticent on which considerations, 
between the competition and public interest, should take antecedence when there is 
a clear conflict.10 The cacophony of competition and public interest considerations 
therefore bear the grey area which this study seeks to elucidate.  
 
This study considers the following issues: whether public interest considerations are 
of equal importance to competition considerations in merger regulation; whether 
public interests do not trump on competition considerations in merger 
determinations, and if so, what is the appropriate legal approach to balance these 
conflicting tests; whether the public interest grounds can be justified from a 
competition law perspective; and how these considerations have impacted on 
merger regulation since the coming into force of the Act. The study also considers 
the Competition Amendment Act11 and how it impacts on balancing between 
competition and public interest considerations. 
 
To distinguish this work from other works that may have gone before on the question 
of public interest versus competition considerations in merger review, the main focus 
of this study is to investigate which consideration, between public interest and 
competition considerations, takes precedence in the event of conflict between the 
                                            
6 Act 89 of 1998. 
7 Sec 12A(1) of the Act. 
8 Sec 12A(1)(a) of the Act, as amended by section 9 of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018. 
9 Sect 12A(1)(b) and 1A of the Act, as amended by section 9 of the 2018 Amendment Act. 
10 Balthasar S The Interface of Competition Law, Industrial Policy and Development Concerns: The 
Case of South Africa (Springer, 2018) 167. 
11 Act 18 of 2018. 
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two. The study therefore does not, as a central point of its departure, question the 
need and desirability of public interest considerations in merger review. To the extent 
that the debate on the need and desirability of public interest considerations in 
merger review may form part of this study, this will be done for purposes only of 
enriching analysis on the main question  of this study: which consideration between 
public interest and competition considerations takes precedence in the event of 
conflict between the two. 
 
1.2. Problem statement  
 
South African competition policy and law have a unique feature in their merger 
analysis; this being the inclusion of public interests alongside competition 
considerations. The inclusion of public interest considerations in merger review, just 
like the origination of competition policy in South Africa, can be linked to 
government’s effort to counter the excessive concentration of economic power.12 As 
Hantke-Domas observes, the role of the public interests in competition law has more 
to do with the realisation of political and moral values.13 Justification for the 
realisation of such values through competition policy can be traced back to South 
Africa’s pre-constitutional order. As such, South Africa’s economic and political 
history had a significant bearing in the formulation of the provisions and objectives of 
the Act.14  
 
However, the immediate legal objective of merger regulation remains to ensure that 
the merged entity does not result in the market becoming less competitive. Accepting 
this as the main objective of merger regulation, how then do, public interest 
considerations marry with this objective?  
                                            
12 Roberts S. “The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development: The South African 
Experience” 2004 Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, Working Paper 8 at 7. See also Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission ‘Better Regulation of Economic Infrastructure: Country-
Based Review’ (2013) Working Paper No. 8, at 10. 
13 Hantke-Domas M “The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non Existence or Misinterpretation?” 
2003 European Journal of Law and Economics. 
14 Staples J & Masamba M “Fourteen years later: An assessment of the realisation of the objectives of 
the Competition Act 89 of 1998,” paper presented at the 6th Annual Competition Commission, 
Competition Tribunal and Mandela Institute Conference on Competition Law, Economics and Policy in 




The Act is said to have been crafted in such a way that gives effect to “the traditional 
functions of promoting and maintaining competition while making provision for 
special needs of a developing economy.”15 These “special needs”, being the public 
interest considerations, have caused much debate and confusion. The Act instructs 
that, in order for a merger to be approved, it must satisfy both competition and public 
interest considerations. However, as stated above, the Act is reticent as to which of 
these sometimes conflicting considerations should take priority in the event that the 
two conflict. 
  
1.3. Point of departure and hypothesis  
 
Competition authorities, in deciding a notified merger, have the power to prohibit the 
merger or to approve it subject to, or without, conditions.16 Approving a merger 
“subject to conditions”, may allow competition authorities to balance potentially 
conflicting considerations of competition and public interests. As the Competition 
Tribunal observed in Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd and Stellenbosch Farmers 
Winery Group Ltd,17 contradictions can be of two types: one is when opposite 
interests collide head on, where we are faced with a stark choice of whether to 
prohibit or approve a merger.18 The other situation being where the opposite 
interests avoid one another, “like two vehicle bypassing each other in opposite 
directions on a dual lane road.”19 
 
The latter type of conflict is straightforward and deserves no further discussion. Of 
particular interest, however, is the former type of conflict, which is often fraught with 
boisterous debates. A question which flows naturally from the former is: are 
authorities consistent in dealing with the conflict that often arise between the 
                                            
15 Buthelezi Z & Njisane Y “Public Interest and Prohibited Conduct: A Juggling Act?” 2014 Without 
Prejudice 32.  
16 Sec 14(b) & sec 14A(b) of the Act. 
17 (08/LM/Feb02) [2003] ZACT 15 (19 March 2003). 
18 Ibid [221]. 
19 Ibid [222]. 
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competition and public interests inquiries? Grimbeek and others analysed the 
consistency of the Competition Commission in dealing with merger decisions 
between 2002 and 2009, and found that the Competition Commission has been 
consistent in its merger decisions both at applying the public interest considerations 
and in its prohibition of mergers for neediness of public interest considerations.20 
However, the shortcoming of their work is that it does not account for those merger 
cases which were referred to the Competition Tribunal as well as those ultimately 
appealed to the Competition Appeal Court. As this study will show,21 there is visible 
inconsistency in dealing with the conflict between the competition and public 
interests inquiries in cases before the Competition Tribunal and Appeal Court. 
Another shortcoming in their work, published back in 2013, is that the period their 
study focused on, 2002 to 2009, is too short (seven years) to show any appreciable 
empirical trend. Undoubtedly, a lot has also happened in the merger regime in recent 
years. 
 
In summary, the points of departure and hypothesis underpinning this study are as 
follows: 
a) The purpose of competition law in merger evaluation is to identify and prevent 
the would-be anticompetitive effects a merger – especially horizontal mergers – 
would pose on a particular market.22 Since public interest considerations are not 
competition related, their inclusion in competition policy is necessary as they 
provide relief to socio-economic concerns arising directly from a merger. 
b) Despite the Act’s valour to provide for the public interest considerations in 
merger evaluation, the Act is reticent on which considerations – between the 
competition related and public interest related – should take antecedence in 
case of conflict. 
c) Given that the primary aim of competition policy is economic efficiency, the 
authorities have dealt with the ambiguity by holding that competition 
                                            
20 Grimbeek S, Koch SF & Grimbeek RJ “The Consistency of Merger Decisions at the South African 
Competition Commission” 2013 South African Journal of Economics at 22-24. 
21 See chapter 3 below. 
22Kelly L, Unterhalter D, Goodman I, Smith P, & Youens P Principles of Competition Law in South 
Africa (Oxford, 2017) 171. See also Neuhoff M (ed) A Practical Guide to the South African 
Competition Act (LexisNexis, 2017) 237-238. 
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considerations take antecedence when in conflict with public interest 
considerations.    
d) Recent amendments to the Competition Act have come with specific emphasis 
to public interest considerations in merger evaluation. This added emphasis on 
public interest considerations does not alter the position that competition 
considerations triumph over public interest considerations when the two conflict. 
 
1.4. The structure of the thesis  
 
The study comprises five chapters. The five chapters shall be organised in the 
following order:   
1.4.1. Chapter 1  
 
Chapter 1 of the study is the introduction, which basically provides an introduction of 
the subject matter of the study. It also includes the problem statement, which 
identifies the grey area of the study, as well as the points of departure and 
hypothesis which underpins the central ideas and arguments of the study. 
 
1.4.2. Chapter 2 
  
This chapter discusses the general legal principles applicable to merger review 
under section 12A of the Act.   
1.4.3. Chapter 3 
 
This chapter analyses the most notable merger cases decided by the competition 
authorities with a view to assess how the conflict between public interest and 




1.4.4. Chapter 4 
This chapter examines the 2018 Competition Amendment Act and how it impacts on 
resolving the conflict between competition and public interest considerations in future 
merger reviews. 
  
1.4.5. Chapter 5 
 
As is customary, this chapter contains the main observation and conclusion of the 


























CHAPTER 2: GENERAL PRINCIPLES   
2.1. Introduction  
  
Section 12A of the Competition Act,23 (henceforth ‘the Act’), regulates the process of 
merger consideration. A merger, in the simplest terms, is when two independent 
firms combine their businesses.24  The Act provides a more elaborate and technical 
definition of a merger. In terms of the Act, “a merger occurs when one or more firms 
directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or 
part of the business of another firm.”25 From the definition, it is clear that the 
acquisition of one firm by another need not only be direct nor in whole. Even indirect 
acquisition of only a part of another firm’s business is enough to constitute a merger. 
The acquisition may occur as a result of the purchasing or leasing of shares, an 
interest or assets of the target firm.26 It may also occur from an amalgamation or 
other combination processes with the other firm.27 The Act goes further to list 
instances where a person is regarded as having control as per the definition of a 
merger.28 
  
The definition of a merger is significant, as it guides us to know with precision 
whether what is being assessed is a merger or not, before any further enquiries may 
take place. However, the definition is important for purposes of this study, only to the 
extent of determining whether a transaction constitutes a merger. What is germane 
to this study is the evaluation of mergers in terms of section 12A of the Act. Section 
12A provides that in considering a merger the competition authorities must 
determine the effect of a merger on competition and public interest grounds.  
 
What follows henceforward is an in-depth assessment of the role and importance of 
the bilateral test of competition and public interest considerations in merger 
                                            
23 Act 89 of 1998. 
24 Neuhoff M (ed) A Practical Guide to the South African Competition Act 2nd ed (LexisNexis 2017) 
235. 
25 Sec 12(1)(a) of the Act. 
26 Sec 12(1)(b)(i) of the Act.  
27 Sec 12(1)(b)(ii) of the Act.  
28 See sec 12(2) of the Act. For the sake of relevance, this provision is not discussed any further. 
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evaluation. Particular attention will be given to the conflict between competition and 
public interest considerations, which have sparked a plethora of arguments. The 
study will analyse the legislature’s objective in merger evaluation, particularly with 
regards to the bilateral test of competition and public interest considerations. The 
study will also look at the impact of the 2018 Competition Amendment Act, on 
matters pertinent to this study. 
 
2.2. Merger consideration: general overview 
 
The Competition authorities,29 whenever required to determine a merger, must 
assess whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition.30 
If it appears that the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, 
they must then determine whether the merger is likely or not to result in any 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which is greater than, and 
offset the anti-competitive effect of the merger, that may only result if the merger 
were approved.31 The competition authorities must further determine whether the 
merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds.32 Even if the 
merger is not likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the authorities are 
still required to determine whether it can be justified on substantial public interest 
grounds.33 This bilateral test of competition and public interest considerations in 
merger evaluation is unique in that not many countries – save for most developing 
countries – explicitly include public interest considerations in their merger analysis.34 
                                            
29 For ease of reference, ‘competition authorities’ refers to the Competition Commission and the 
Competition Tribunal whether as separate entities or as a collective, and where the context fits, it also 
refers to the Competition Appeal Court.  
30 Sec 12A(1) of the Act. See in this regard Trident Steel (Pty) Ltd & Dorbyl Limited (89LM/Oct00) 
[2001] ZACT 2 (30 January 2001).  
31 Sec 12A(1)(a) of the Act.  
32 Sec 12A(1)(b) of the Act. The public interest test under sec 12A(1)(a) is juxtaposed with, and 
occurs as a result of, the competition test in terms of sec 12A(1)((a). Apart from that, the public 
interest test in Sec 12A(1)(b) applies even where the merger is not likely to substantively prevent or 
lessen competition.  
33 Sec 12A(1A). 
34 Smith P & Swan A “Africa: Public Interest Factors in Competition Decisions” 2014 Global 
Competition Review. See also Oxenham J “Balancing public interest merger considerations before 
sub-Saharan African competition jurisdictions with the quest for multi-jurisdictional merger control 
certainty” 2012 US-China Law Review 211. 
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Unlike restrictive practices, such as price fixing and collusive tendering, and abuse of 
dominance, mergers do not present the most out-rightly discernible and pernicious 
anti-competitive effects. This is mainly because of the pre-emptive nature of merger 
evaluation. The legal test for merger evaluation is one of few legal tests that rely 
heavily on prediction, as opposed to remedying an act which has already occurred or 
an act which is imminent to occur. To this effect, the Competition Tribunal in the 
merger case between Mondi Limited and Kohler Cores and Tubes (a division of 
Kohler Packaging Limited)35  aptly acknowledged that:  
“Of course a prediction must be supported by evidence, but no amount of reliable 
evidence will remove the predictive or ‘probabilistic’ element in merger adjudication. 
This is explicitly recognized in the Act, which enjoins us to determine the ‘likely’ 
consequences of a transaction before us. The Act provides explicitly for a regime 
where the effect of a merger is assessed prior to its implementation. The necessary 
implication of this regime is that adjudication is a priori, not post hoc. Since the 
merger has not taken place at the time of adjudication and indeed may not take place 
at all, an element of prediction regarding what may happen after implementation is 
inherent in the statutory design. Fortunately significant advances in economic theory, 
particularly in game theory, have eased the task of prediction – based on 
observations of past behaviour and on the rational responses of profit maximizing 
firms to a given set of incentives we are able to make predictions from a strong 
scientific basis…”36  
 
With this in mind, it should be axiomatic to envisage the vast contestations that take 
place in a merger evaluation process. This is mainly because of the predictability of 
the test. The Tribunal, as highlighted above in Mondi, is aware of the challenges that 
come with this legal test. It, however, notes advances in economic theory as having 
eased the task. Despite such economic advances, the balance between the 
competition and public interest considerations still lie unhinged. It is often said that 
merger evaluation calls for a “predictive judgment, necessarily probabilistic and 
judgmental rather than demonstrable.”37 To this, Lewis is quick to warn that this does 
not entail “guesswork and crystal-ball gazing” – it is an exercise that is fact-based 
and necessarily requires predicting the likely responses to changes and likely 
                                            
35 Mondi Limited and Kohler Cores and Tubes (a division of Kohler Packaging Limited) (06/LM/Jan02) 
[2002] ZACT 40 (20 June 2002). 
36 Ibid [24].  
37 Hospital Corporation of America v Federal Trade Commission 807 F.2D 1381 (1986). 
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changes in the matrix of factual evidence.38 Notwithstanding, the exercise is still very 
much probabilistic, thus making the contestations valid.  
 
It is important to note that a pro-competitive merger may still be prohibited for 
impecuniousness of public interest considerations, and conversely, a merger that 
promotes public interest considerations may still be prohibited for indigence of 
competition considerations.39 What this only presupposes is that the two tests are of 
equal footing. However, even where equality exists, there still has to be a 
compromise for those rare occasions where contradictions arise. The question, 
accordingly, is, where do we draw the line? I employ semantics applied by the 
Competition Tribunal in an effort to answer the question later in this study.40 The 
purpose of this part of the work is to elucidate on the different yet compelling 
arguments for and against the bilateral test in merger analysis in order to answer the 
overriding question: which of the two considerations should take precedence when 
the two conflict?   
   
2.2.1. Amendment to the Act 
 
Despite the teeth that the competition authorities enjoyed under the Act, calls have 
been made for some time that something must be done to sharpen their teeth even 
more. Further, the calls included that the regulation of competition law must be much 
more inclusive. The result, inter alia, was the Competition Amendment Act,41 which 
came into effect on the 06th of July 2019.42 Of note, for purposes of this study, is the 
new section 12A(1A) of the Act, as introduced by section 9 of the Amendment Act. 
Section 12A(1A) provides that “despite” the determination on competition 
considerations in section 12A(1), competition authorities must “also” determine 
whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest 
                                            
38 Lewis D Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (Edward Elgar 
2013) 92. 
39 Harmony Gold Mining Co Limited/Gold Fields Limited (93/LM/Nov04) [2005] ZACT 29 (18 May 
2005) [45]. 
40 See chapter 3 below. 
41 Act 18 of 2018. 
42 Proclamation No. 46 of 2019, Government Gazette vol. 649 12 July 2019 No. 42578.  
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grounds.43 This wording implies that whatever the finding is on the competition test, 
the public interest test must still be carried out. This wording, although slightly 
different, does not introduce anything new substantively. Save for semantics and 
choice of words, the amendment is, in substance no different to the old section 
12A(1)(b).  In fact, the amendment further exacerbates the primary concern of this 
study.  Section 12A(3), which provides a list of public interest factors to be taken into 
account when conducting merger review, has been amended to include “small and 
medium businesses” in the public interest grounds.44 Again, this amendment does 
not affect the substance of the provision.45  
    
2.3. Competition considerations  
2.3.1. Importance of regulating merger evaluation  
 
To understand the competition test in merger evaluation, it is trite to first appreciate 
the importance of merger evaluation and how it impacts on competition. Neuhoff 
submits that merger regulation is an attempt to proactively regulate the structure of 
the economy and markets so as to ensure the optimal functioning of markets.46 
Neuhoff further submits that merger regulation is an effort to prevent market 
structures from developing in a manner that may enhance the ability of firms to either 
abuse their unilateral or co-ordinated market power.47 This, Kelly and others submit, 
is because a merger may result in the removal of an effective competitor, for 
example where two firms in the same market propose to merge, thus providing 
structural incentives for the merged entity to become dominant with the possibility of 
abusing such dominance.48 
  
                                            
43 Sec 12A(1)(b) which states that the authorities must “otherwise, determine whether the merger can 
or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds…”, bears the same meaning as the 
amendment. 
44 Sec 9(e) of the Amendment Act. 
45 I provide a more detailed analysis of the implications of the Amendment Act in chapter 4 below. 
46 Neuhoff (n 24) above at 237. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Kelly L, Unterhalter D, Youens P, Goodman I, & Smith P Principles of Competition Law in South 
Africa (Oxford, 2017) 171-172. 
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A more practical example of concern to competition is a horizontal merger. 
Horizontal mergers, by definition, it is submitted, “reduce the number of competitors 
in a market.”49 The impact of such mergers will often depend on the market 
structures.50 For instance, in a market with few competitors and where the ability to 
meet consumer demand is not readily possible, the loss of a single competitor (due 
to a merger) may have dire competition effects on that particular market.51 It may 
well be that two small firms merge in order to enhance incentives and efficiencies, so 
as to compete effectively with competitors. The latter is not of much concern to the 
authorities because as Green and Staffiero pithily posit, “[big is not always bad] 
especially when not directly linked to the possibility of abuse practices but rather to a 
higher ability to engage in fierce competition, which in general tends to benefit 
consumers.”52 The former, however, is of serious concern to competition for its 
potential anti-competitiveness.  
 
Lewis stresses on the impact of mergers on the structure of markets, by stating that 
mergers may result in single-firm dominance that may fortify abusive unilateral 
conduct.53 Further, the merged entity may gain enhanced incentives that may have 
the potential to vex competition.54 In Masscash Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Finro Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Finro Cash and Carry55 the Competition Tribunal drew this apt analogy 
on the importance of merger regulation:  
“Economic theory suggests that unilateral anticompetitive effects are more likely in 
situations where differentiated-product firms compete closely, each representing the 
best alternative to the other for a substantial volume of business. Two firms might be 
very close competitors because they supply products and services that are seen as 
                                            
49 Clarke J International Merger Policy: Applying Domestic Law to International Markets (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 18. See also Kelly L, Unterhalter D, Youens P, Goodman I, & Smith P 
Principles of Competition Law in South Africa (Oxford, 2017) 171. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid 19.  
52 Green J & G Staffiero “Economics of Merger Control” in The 2007 Handbook of Competition 
Economics: Global Competition Review Special Report (GCR 2007) 8 – 9.  
53 Lewis D Enforcing Competition Rules in South Africa: Thieves at the Dinner Table (Edward Elgar 
2013) 71.  
54 Coppola M “Consideration of Public Interest Factors in Antitrust Merger Control” Competition Policy 
International 24 March 2015, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/consideration-of-public-interest-factors-inantitrust-
merger-control/, accessed on 20 May 2019. 
55 Masscash Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Finro Enterprises (Pty) Ltd t/a Finro Cash and Carry (04/LM/Jan09) 
[2009] ZACT 66 (30 November 2009). 
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very similar by customers, and a merger between such firms might create a larger 
reduction in rivalry than would a merger between more differentiated firms.”56 
 
The consequence of these combinations has the potential to result in monopolies, 
which, in turn, result in reduced competition and thus less consumer choice.57 
Competition law, in broad terms, is concerned with regulating conduct that threatens 
or harms competition, therefore resulting in less choice for consumers. The concept 
‘the more the merrier’ is apposite of competition law, thus the interest of competition 
law in merger control is premised on this basis. 
 
2.3.2. Regulating the competition considerations  
     
The Act enjoins the competition authorities to determine whether the merger will 
substantially prevent or lessen competition, and if so, whether the merger is likely to 
result in any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that may offset 
the lessening of competition.58 The authorities must, in their pursuit, first determine 
the relevant market or markets to be affected.59 This determination is for an obvious 
and simple reason: to understand and fully acquaint with the structure of the affected 
market or markets.  
 
In addition to identifying the relevant market, the authorities must consider certain 
competition considerations in merger evaluation. For instance, the competition 
authorities must have regard to, inter alia, the merger’s impact on “the actual and 
potential level of import competition in a market”;60 ease of entry into the market;61 
the level of concentration, including collusion in the market;62 and “whether the 
                                            
56 Ibid [59]. 
57 Hovenkamp H Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice 3rd ed. (West 
Group, 2005) 12.1.b. See also Kelly L, Unterhalter D, Youens P, Goodman I, & Smith P Principles of 
Competition Law in South Africa (Oxford, 2017) 172.   
58 Sec 12A(1)(a) of the Act. 
59 Kelly et al (n 57) above 192. 
60 Sec 12A(2)(a) of the Act. 
61 Sec 12A(2)(b) of the Act.  
62 Sec 12A(2)(c) of the Act.  
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merger will result in the removal of an effective competitor”.63 These factors are 
necessary in examining the competition considerations of a merger.64   
 
2.3.2.1. Defences: efficiencies, technological and other pro-competitive gains 
 
The Act enlists three defences to justify otherwise ‘anti-competitive’ mergers. It 
registers efficiencies, technological and other pro-competitive gains as justifications 
for mergers that would otherwise be considered as being anti-competitive. I deal with 
each defence briefly rursus.  
 
The efficiency defence is considered a full defence in the South African competition 
law regime.65 Efficiencies have been concisely defined as “the measure of the level 
of wastage of the society’s resources.”66 This presupposes that “[c]onduct is 
‘efficient’ if it minimises waste and ‘inefficient’ if it increases waste.”67 For instance, it 
may be efficient for firms competing in the same market to merge on account that the 
merger would result in better economies of scale and thereby increase in size and in 
consumer outreach. The Competition Tribunal has held that efficiencies must be 
quantified, verifiable and must be a direct consequence of the merger considered.68  
   
There has been little discussion in the South African competition law on the 
technological and other pro-competitive gains as a defence. I would argue that much 
of this is because of the broader and more encompassing nature that the efficiency 
defence tends to play, resulting in merging parties opting to rather raise the 
efficiency defence alone. Moreover, South Africa is less innovative technologically to 
have the technological defence manifest more in mergers. However, these defences 
are nevertheless available to merging parties to prove that the anticipated merger 
will result in either a technological or any other pro-competitive gain. I can predict 
                                            
63 Sec 12A(2)(h) of the Act.  
64 For the sake of relevance, I do not discuss the competition considerations save to mention them in 
obiter.  
65 Sutherland P & Kemp K Competition Law of South Africa (LexisNexis 2013) para 10.75.  
66 Clarke J (n 49) above 21. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc/ Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd Case 81/AM/Dec10. 
16 
 
that in a world that is more and more consumed by digitalisation, these defences 
may be resorted to in order to justify an otherwise anti-competitive merger.  
 
2.4.  Public interest considerations 
  
The legislature thought it fit to have the public interest considerations as a 
standalone test for merger analysis. The Act provides that the competition 
authorities, after conducting the competition test, must determine whether the 
merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds.69 Section 
12A(1)(b) on the one hand, is the public interest test which seeks to reconcile the 
competition test with the public interest test. This provision juxtaposes merger review 
on whether the merger will likely result in the lessening or prevention of competition 
and if so, whether it may be justified on competition defences;70 and whether such a 
merger may also be justified on listed public interest grounds. Simply put, where a 
merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the authorities must 
determine whether such a merger is likely to result in any competition defences, and 
whether it can or cannot be justified on public interest grounds. 
  
Section 12A(1A) on the other hand, is a balancing approach which essentially 
requires the public interest test to be carried out to balance against the competition 
effects of a merger. In Anglo American Holdings Ltd & Kumba Resources Ltd71 the 
Tribunal rightly stated that the public interest inquiry in the old section 12A(1)(b) 
meant that authorities must have regard to the public interest considerations even 
where competition is not implicated, because of the word “otherwise” in the 
provision.72  The public interest in this provision, as the Tribunal noted in Distillers 
Corporation SA Limited & Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd,73 may permit an 
otherwise anti-competitive merger and conversely permit the prohibition of an 
                                            
69 Sec 12A(1)(b) & sec 12A(1A)  of the Act.  
70 Competition defences as provided in the Act are technological, efficiencies or other pro-competitive 
gain. 
71 (46/LM/Jun02). 




otherwise pro-competitive effect.74  Further, the public interest inquiry in this 
provision always emerges as having passed the competition inquiry.75 Sutherland 
and Kemp point out that the fact that the two old provisions – section 12A(1)(a)(ii) 
and 12A(a)(b) – have the same wording, is a reflection on the section’s “mediocre 
drafting”.76 I agree. However, this does not change the position already explained.77 
 
The competition authorities must determine the effect of a merger on a particular 
industrial sector or region; employment; the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; 
the ability of national industries to compete in international markets; and the 
promotion of greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the levels of 
ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and workers in firms in the 
market.78 These factors have been listed in the Act as the public interest 
considerations in merger analysis. 
 
The Competition Commission published “Guidelines on the Assessment of Public 
Interest Provisions in Merger Regulation under the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998” 
(‘the Guidelines’).79 The Guidelines seek to provide guidance as to the approach 
likely to be followed by the Competition Commission in a merger analysis, as well as 
the kind of information required to satisfy the public interest grounds.80 The general 
approach adopted in the Guidelines is as follows:  
“6.1. The Commission in general will adopt the following steps when analysing each 
of the above public interest provisions: 
6.1.1. determine the likely effect on the public interest; 
6.1.2. determine whether the alleged effect on a specific public interest is a 
result of that merger or is merger specific. In other words, is there a sufficient 
causal nexus between the merger and the alleged effect; 
6.1.3. determine whether these effects are substantial; 
                                            
74 Ibid [214]. 
75 Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited & Gold Fields Limited (93/LM/Nov04) [43]. 
76 Sutherland P & Kemp K Competition Law of South Africa (LexisNexis, 2013) 10-92.  
77 Ibid. See also Balthasar S The Interface of Competition Law, Industrial Policy and Development 
Concerns: The Case of South Africa (Springer, 2018) 166-167. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger Regulation under the 
Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (as amended). General Notice 86 of 2015, No. 38448. 
80 Ibid at p 8 para 4.1.  
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6.1.4. consider whether the merging parties can justify the likely effect on the 
particular public interest; and 
6.1.5. consider possible remedies to address any likely negative effect on the 
public interest.”81 
If it appears on the onset that the effect on the public interest is not merger specific, 
then it is the end of the enquiry.82 Further, if the effect is found to be merger specific, 
the Commission must determine whether the effect is substantial, and if it is found 
that the effect is not substantial, then that is the end of the enquiry.83  The Guidelines 
are novel in that they provide merging parties with the approach likely to be taken by 
the Competition Commission in considering the public interest grounds, the kind of 
information needed to satisfy the public interest grounds, and they act as a form of 
formula to the Commission on which approach to take. However, merger 
transactions are considered on a case-by-case basis, and to add salt to injury, the 
Guidelines do not elucidate on how public interest considerations should be 
determined against competition considerations. The Guidelines, further, do not 
account for merger cases heard by the Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court. 
  
The Background Note to the Draft Guidelines holds that it is “imperative to determine 
the contours of public interest in merger regulation for policy certainty”. Whereas, the 
International Competition Network recognizes the public interest considerations in 
merger regulation regime. It states that: “If a jurisdiction's merger test includes 
consideration of non-competition factors, the way in which the competition and non-
competition considerations interact should also be made transparent.”84 It may be 
that the Guidelines provide the contours within which the public interest 
considerations should be applied as regards mergers, however, the Guidelines as 
well as the Act, do not demonstrate how the relationship between competition and 
public interest considerations should be maintained in case of conflict. 
   
 
                                            
81 Ibid at p 11 para 6. Emphasis from the source.   
82 Ibid at para 6.2. 
83 Ibid.  
84 International Competition Network, Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, the Legal 
Framework for Competition Merger Analysis. Own emphasis added.  
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2.4.1.  Public interest and the principle of deference  
 
The public interest considerations, strictly speaking, properly belong to the executive 
arm of government, since these considerations involve policy making and policy 
implementation.85 As a result, it is vital that the competition authorities exhibit some 
level of deference towards these state institutions in their application of the public 
interest consideration in merger transactions.86 In Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd / 
Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd87 the Competition Tribunal warned that: 
“The competition authorities, however well intentioned, are well advised not to pursue 
their public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner lest they damage precisely 
those interests that they ostensibly seek to protect.”88 
 
The Competition Tribunal subsequently cautioned in Walmart Stores Inc v Massmart 
Holdings Ltd89 that the application of the public interest does not mean the 
competition authorities must entertain every concern arising from a merger 
transaction on account of public interest.90 The Tribunal succinctly held that: “Our job 
in merger control is not to make the world a better place, only to prevent it becoming 
worse as a result of a specific transaction.”91 What this clearly demonstrates is that 
the competition authorities are not tasked with determining whether public interest 
concerns raised by parties are valid policy concerns, but whether such concerns fall 





                                            
85 Vivian RW “Constitutionality of South Africa’s Competition Policy” 2011 Paper presented at the Free 
Market Foundation, 21 September 2011.  
86 Gal M “Reality Bites (or Bits): The Political Economy of Antitrust in Small Economies” 2001 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s 28th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, 
25-26 October 2001 at.  
87 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd / Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (66/LM/Oct10). 
88 Ibid [58]. Own emphasis added.  
89 Walmart Stores Inc / Massmart Holdings Ltd (73/LM/Dec10) [2011] ZACT 42 (29 June 2011). 
90 Ibid [35]. 




2.4.2. Limiting the public interest  
 
2.4.2.1. Public interest must be merger specific  
 
One of the important limitations of the public interest considerations is that they must 
be merger specific. In Walmart Stores Inc v Massmart Holdings Ltd93 the Competition 
Tribunal noted that one of the limitations of the public interest considerations is that 
the public interest considerations must be merger specific. In other words, the 
merger must be the cause of the public interest concern.94 Should it be found that 
the public interest existed preceding and irrespective of the merger transaction, it 
cannot be regarded as being merger-specific.95  
 
In Glencore International PLC & Xstrata PLC96 there were several public interest 
concerns which did not or could not arise as a result of the merger. The Tribunal 
noted that it could not do anything more than highlight such concerns as they were 
not merger-specific, however weighty.97 The Tribunal was correct not to pursue such 
public interest concerns any further; doing otherwise would be ultra vires as the 
authorities’ role in such circumstances is not to determine whether public interest 
concerns are legitimate policy goals,98 but whether there is causation between the 
concerns and the merger. Absent causation between the public interest concerns 
and the merger, there can be no basis for intervention by the competition authorities. 
      
2.4.2.2. Public interest must be substantial   
  
The Act not only charges competition authorities to determine the impact of a merger 
on public interest grounds, but does so to a specific tune: on substantial public 
                                            
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid [32].  
95 Neuhoff M (ed) A Practical Guide to the South African Competition Act 2nd ed (LexisNexis 2017) at 
274.  
96 33/LM/Mar12. 
97 Ibid [103] to [105]. 
98 Walmart Stores supra [32].  
21 
 
interest grounds.99  By substantiality it is meant that the positive effects of a merger 
on public interest must outweigh the negative effects on competition.100 Parties 
alleging substantiality must justify the substantial positive effects on public 
interest.101 The competition authorities will then have to balance the negative effects 
on competition against the positive effects on public interest.102 Simply put, the public 
interest must be so compelling that their effect may not be ignored. 
 
The approach to determining substantiality was adopted in Wal-Mart & Massmart.103 
In terms of this approach, the substantiality of the public interest is assessed against 
the background of the entire economy and not only on the context of the merging 
parties alone.104 In Glencore International PLC & Xstrata PLC105 for example, the 
Tribunal protected one hundred jobs in a sector where thousands of jobs are lost 
every month because of market conditions. Balkin and Mbikiwa submit that this 
decision is not substantial because it is irreconcilable for every merger to be 
hamstrung “by the possibility of only a few retrenchments”.106 The substantiality 
threshold demands that the context of the South African economy be considered in 
relation to the public interest effect of a particular merger.107 
  
2.5. Public interest considerations: a necessary policy in merger evaluation?  
 
Public interest consideration is a unique policy in merger evaluation. Its inclusion in 
the Act does not come without sceptics. Here, I consider the arguments advanced 
both against, and in favour of, the public interest considerations in merger analysis. 
Although such arguments are academic in nature, they, notwithstanding, contribute 
towards a better appreciation of the inclusion and application of the public interest 
considerations in the merger remit.  
                                            
99 Sec 12A(1)(b) of the Act.  
100 Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger Regulation under the 
Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (as amended). General Notice 86 of 2015, No. 38448, at 6.3.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Walmart-Massmart [32]. 
104 Balkin & Mbikiwa Balancing Competition Act: paradox” 2014 Business Law and Tax Review 2. 
105 Glencore International (n 96) Supra.  
106 Balkin & Mbikiwa above at 2. 
107 Ibid.  
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2.5.1. Criticism of the public interest considerations  
 
Balkin and Mbikiwa contend that in a developing economy such as South Africa, 
where unemployment is rife and where the need for redistribution of wealth and 
ownership is needed, the inclusion of the public interest considerations in merger 
evaluation cannot be faulted.108 However, the authors submit that the inclusion of the 
public interest considerations is sometimes at odds with, and is divorced from, the 
primary objectives of competition law and policy109 The authors further postulate that 
the “pendulum has swung too far in the direction of public interest 
[considerations]”.110 For instance, in Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Competition Commission, In re: Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Glenrand MIB Ltd111, 
the Tribunal approved a merger with imposition of employment conditions that would 
force the merged entity to retain an “inefficient employee base”. The merger was 
approved on condition that employees earning a certain amount of money would not 
be retrenched for a period of two years. Despite the fact that this would result in 
duplication of job positions, the public interest considerations were still upheld.112 
 
Glencore Internation PLC v Xstrata PLC113 is another case where the pendulum is 
believed to have “swung too far in the direction of the public interest 
[considerations]”. Here, the Competition Tribunal approved the merger transaction 
between the parties on condition that no retrenchments of no more than eighty un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers would take place within the first ninety days, and a 
maximum of one hundred retrenchments as a result of the merger, forever. Balkin 
and Mbikiwa ask this important question in respect of the two decisions by the 
Competition Tribunal: were the public interest concerns substantial?114 They argue 
that the question of substantiality should be assessed on the context of the economy 
                                            
108 Balkin J & M Mbikiwa “Balancing Competition Act: paradox” 2014 Business Law and Tax Review 
1. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid 2.  
111 Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Competition Commission, In re: Aon South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Glenrand MIB Ltd (37/AM/Apr11) [2011] ZACT 100 (24 November 2011). 
112 Balkin & Mbikiwa (n 34) above.  
113 Glencore Internation PLC v Xstrata PLC (33/LM/Mar12) [2013] ZACT 11 (6 March 2013). 
114 Balkin & Mbikiwa above.  
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as a whole, rather than on the basis of each transaction.115  They further reason that 
the public interest in Glencore, for example, was not substantial in that the Tribunal 
protected one hundred jobs, as an attempt to save the public interest of employment, 
in a sector where thousands of jobs are lost each month due to market conditions.   
 
The purpose of the Act has come under relentless scrutiny from some 
commentators. Section 2 of the Act lists a host of purposes for which the Act is 
intended. Roberts submits that the objectives of the Act are wide-ranging and takes 
into account concerns that may not always be consistent with one another in the 
actual assessment of cases.116 The objectives of the Act as set out in section 2 are 
as follows: 
“The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in 
order– 
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the  
economy; 
(b)  to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
(c)  to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare 
of South Africans; 
(d)  to expand opportunities for South African participation in world 
markets and to recognise the role of foreign competition in the 
Republic; 
(e)  to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy; and 
(f)  to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged people.”   
 
The public interest considerations in merger analysis, by necessary implication, flow 
from the objectives of the Act – particularly the last four objectives. The first two 
listed objectives, on the one hand,117 can easily be classified as the competition 
considerations in the widest sense of the Act. The last four objectives,118 on the other 
                                            
115 Ibid.  
116 Roberts S “The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development: The South African 
Experience” 2004 Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 7. 
117 (a) To promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
   (b) To provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. 
118(c) To promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South               
Africans; 
(d) To expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and to recognise 
the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
(e) To ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
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hand, can easily be classified as the public interest considerations in the widest 
sense of the Act. Marrying these sometimes conflicting considerations has come 
under scrutiny, most notably from Reekie, one of the earliest antagonists of the 
public interest considerations. He warns that: 
“The task of the competition authorities is difficult. To add [the public interest 
considerations] … to their remit may make it impossible…there is no denying that 
tough political choices often have to be made between the varying objectives of 
[public interests and competition interests]... Competition authorities, however, 
should not have to make them. If they so attempt it merely dilutes the predictability of 
their decision or results in inappropriate lobbying by defendants or plaintiffs.”119  
 
Reekie cautions that relying on competition policy to advance the interests of 
employment, redistribution and black economic empowerment is “inappropriate”.120 
He adds further that when government wishes to achieve public interest objectives, it 
should apply other policies; the public interest goals are in the “bailiwick of other 
agencies”.121 These contentions are merited. We ought to eschew bequeathing 
objectives other than those primarily intended for a specific institution on that 
particular institution as government’s effort to resuscitate socio-economic and other 
public interest objectives, lest the credibility of such institutions be lost. Contrary to 
this, the drive and indeed obligation to enhance public interest objectives, is for 
everyone to bear. Furthermore, the authorities’ evaluation of employment interests is 
not unfettered – it relates to employment concerns only as they arise directly from a 
merger.122 To argue that this should be best decided by labour forums would make 
merger evaluation an unnecessarily and undesirably cumbersome process.  A firm 
balance would, however, have to be struck. This is by no means an easy task. 
 
The International Competition Network has set out three cardinal factors of a 
successful merger control; these being, timing, costs and certainty.123 Mergers 
                                                                                                                                       
(f) To promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes 
of historically disadvantaged people.   
119 Reekie WD “The Competition Act: An Economic Perspective” 1999 South African Journal of 
Economics 259.   
120 Ibid 284. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Walmart Stores Inc & Massmart Holdings Ltd (73/LM/Dec10) [2011] ZACT 42 (29 June 2011) [32]. 
123 See in this regard the “Guiding Principles For Merger Notification and Review”, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc591.pdf; and Recommended 
Practices for Merger Notification Procedures, available at 
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should be evaluated as expeditiously as possible to curtail the vulnerability of the 
merging parties. The costs incurred during a merger, being the filing costs and 
defending costs, should be kept to a minimum.  Certainty is also key in merger 
analysis and this is birthed by an objective analysis of the merger against given 
legislative standards.  Smith and Oxenham argue that an extensive analysis of the 
public interest considerations can cause delays and result in uncertainty in merger 
evaluation process and may vitally undercut the aims of the Act.124   
 
Some commentators argue that the public interest grounds are misplaced as they 
are policy-laden and remain the province of the executive and the administrator.125 
Boshoff and others make this emphatic assertion that “[t]he competition authorities 
are not elected officials with a mandate from the electorate to decide on public policy 
issues.”126 Gal argues that making public interest decisions that may impact on 
social, cultural or political consequences may damage democratic values.127 The 
learned author continues that the competition authorities may not be the best-suited 
to balance the competing considerations as they may not possess the most effective 
and efficient means of achieving the objectives.128  
 
I concede that the arguments respectively advanced by these authors have merit 
because, on the one hand, it is the government’s sanctuary to determine policy and 
what is in the public interest. On the other hand, competition authorities, like courts 
of law, do not have in their arsenal the necessary expertise to make decisions that 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf (accessed on 29 June 
2019), et seq.  
124 Smith P & Oxenham J “What is competition good for – weighing the wider benefits of competition 
and the costs of pursuing non-competition objectives”, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
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125 See Vivian RW “Constitutionality of South Africa’s Competition Policy” 2011 Paper presented at 
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126 Boshoff W, Dingley D & Dingley J “The Economics of Public Interest Provisions In South African 
Competition Policy” 2014 Competition Commission. http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
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involve government policy, failing which is to upset democratic values.129 While I 
concede the weight of these arguments, it is desirable to paradoxically advance that 
the arguments are half-baked and myopic. Firstly, the Competition authorities do not 
exercise the public interest analysing powers (in mergers) without a source; they do 
so on account of the legislature’s indictment. Secondly, the rule of law, and indeed 
democratic values, recognise ‘a separation within’ the separation of powers doctrine, 
premised on the law of delegation. Finally, to borrow from Bork, “[t]he need of the 
law generally is for the systematic development of normative models of [legal and] 
judicial behaviour…”130   
 
Smith and Oxenham further argue that pursuing a pure competition test is “inherently 
supportive of growth and employment” in that a departure from this may dissuade 
investment and thus leading to reduced growth and employment.131 In my view, this 
contention is half-baked. One of the basic ways of achieving economic growth is 
through a wider spread of economic participation by all citizens. This not only 
guarantees growth but it also guarantees sustainability and independence. It is far 
much better to have a hundred smaller local firms competing in the markets than just 
three or four multinational firms competing in the local markets. The latter breeds 
potential monopolies and/or oligopolies, with higher barriers to entry into markets 
and reduced consumer choice.  Whereas the former typifies a pro-competitive 
economy that not only promotes competition but promotes inclusivity and more 
consumer choice, all features apposite of competition law and policy. I would further 
argue that South Africa currently is a quintessence of the latter yet unemployment is 
ubiquitous and economic growth is stagnant.  
 
 
   
                                            
129 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (CCT 
27/03) [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at [46] to [48], for a more detailed discussion on courts 
making policy-laden decisions, and why doing so may violate democratic values.  
130 Bork R The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York: Basic Books 1978) 72. Own 
emphasis added.  
131 Ibid. The authors argue that a public interest test is more uncertain than the competition test. 
Further, investors rely on certainty and predictability. As such, one of the ways of growing the 
economy and creating employment is through “investorship”, therefore putting too much emphasis on 
the public interest test dissuades growth and employment, thereby defeating the public interest 
considerations in the process.  
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2.5.2. Approbation of the public interest considerations  
 
It is often suggested that an understanding of the economic consequences of merger 
control is necessary to decipher the potential societal impacts of merger control.132 
Whilst competition law and policy may regulate objectives beyond the pure 
economic, the primary concern of competition law is the economic objectives, 
nonetheless.133 Conversely, merger control has manifest and paradoxical effects on 
the public as a whole.134 This overture is important for, firstly, it recognises the 
impact of mergers on the public in general; secondly, the impact of merger control on 
the public is principally interwoven with the economic effects (competition 
considerations); and finally, the public as well as competition considerations in 
merger control cannot be divorced from one another. As Lewis correctly points out, 
merger evaluation – here and elsewhere – is always influenced by the impact of a 
merger on a particular industrial sector, employment and international 
competitiveness.135 Though in some jurisdictions the public interest in merger 
evaluation may not be explicitly mentioned, they nevertheless somehow subliminally 
influence the determination.136 
  
Modernisation demands that competition law be construed and enforced in a way 
that not only accords with competition considerations, but with economic 
development in the sense of public interest considerations.137 In the South African 
context therefore, public interest considerations are an important feature.138 As a 
result, the inclusion of the public interest must be read in context.139 It is submitted 
that public interest should be the motif of all government action, and that the 
                                            
132 Clarke J International Merger Policy: Applying Domestic Law to International Markets 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 16.  
133 Ibid.  
134 Ibid.  
135 Lewis D “The Role of Public Interest in Merger Evaluation – Speech” Speech given at the 
International Competition Network, Merger Working Group, Naples, Italy 28-29 September 2002. 
www.comptrib.co.za.  
136 Ibid.  
137 Gal MS & Fox EM in Gal MS & others The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions – 
Their Implications for Competition Law 2015 303 – 304.   
138 Dhall V (ed) Competition Law Today – Concepts, Issues, and the Law in Practice (Oxford, 2007) 
340 & 342. 
139 Hartzenberg T “Competition Policy and Enterprise Development: The Role of Public Interest 
Objectives in South Africa’s Competition Policy” 2004 Trade Law Centre Southern Africa 17. 
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enforcement of competition law is ultimately in the public interest.140 It is further 
submitted that public interest considerations may be integrated in statutory 
provisions.141 This integration of the public interest considerations in statutory 
provisions is to benefit the larger society. In the present context, the integration of 
the public interest considerations in section 12A of the Act is to benefit a majority of 
South Africans so as to protect and promote, inter alia, employment and the ability of 
small firms to enter markets.  
 
Njisane rightly posits that the public interest considerations have been included in 
the Act as government’s effort to satisfy the exigent need for South Africa’s 
redistributive justice.142 The advent of democracy meant that the government had to 
come up with new laws and policies in terms of which the economic level grounds of 
all citizens would be equalled, especially of those previously excluded under 
apartheid.143 And the public interest considerations in merger analysis would be a 
part of this measure.144 This finds support in what Lewis firmly postulates: that the 
competition authorities in developing countries have a long way to go to gain 
credibility and legitimacy, and to achieve this, the competition authorities should not 
stand “aloof from those issues that most engage popular sentiment”.145 By “those 
issues that most engage popular sentiment" the author refers to the public interest 
considerations. Lewis further argues that a competition policy that does not 
recognise the public interest considerations would “consign the act [sic] and the 
authorities to the scrap of the heap”. This observation is endorsed by this work, 
though to a certain extent.146      
                                            
140 Balthaser S The Interface of Competition Law, Industrial Policy and Development Concerns: The 
Case of South Africa (Springer 2018) 62. 
141 Ibid.  
142 Njisane, Y. “The Rise of Public Interest: Recent High Profile Mergers” 2011 
www.publicinterestlawgathering.com/wp-content/.../the_rise_of_public_interest.docx at 3. 
 
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid. Whether the public interest considerations in merger evaluation work for the benefit of the 
larger society and whether they contribute as intended to the developmental project, is assessed in 
chapter 4 below.  
145 Lewis (n 135) supra et seq.  
146 Whilst I agree with the learned author’s observation, I should hasten to warn that a capricious 
concurrence of the observation may be both dangerous and misplaced. The danger that it poses lies 
in that, while the public interest considerations are adopted as a means to achieving credibility and 
legitimacy, others may paradoxically and cogently argue that the public interest considerations in fact 
discredits and delegitimizes the South African competition policy on account of treading on non-
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The government of 1994,147 inherited an economy clothed in high levels of inequality 
and concentration of resources in the hands of a few individuals and firms.148 These 
needed to be addressed urgently in a democratic state and the public interest 
considerations are seen as part of the tools of undoing the past injustices.149 The 
proponents of the public interest considerations contend that the inclusion of the 
public interest in competition policy – at least in merger regulation – is essential in 
developing countries, where competition policy is expected to contribute to the 
assuagement of poverty and other social needs.150 The preamble to the Act makes 
the following recordal in favour of the above contentions:  
“The people of South Africa recognise: 
That apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of the past 
resulted in excessive concentrations of ownership and control within the 
national economy, inadequate restraints against anticompetitive trade 
practices, and unjust restrictions on full and free participation in the economy 
by all South Africans. 
That the economy must be open to greater ownership by a greater number of 
South Africans. 
That credible competition law, and effective structures to administer that law, 
are necessary for an efficient functioning economy. 
That an efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing the interests 
of workers, owners and consumers and focussed on development, will benefit 
all South Africans.”151 
 
The preamble goes further to state that the Act was enacted in order to 
provide all South Africans with an equal opportunity to actively participate in 
the economy; to regulate the transfer of economic ownership in a way that 
accords with the public interest; and to create greater capability for all South 
                                                                                                                                       
competition matters. The misplacement of the argument lies in the simple dialectic that the public 
interest considerations in merger evaluation may have been wrongly bequeathed to the competition 
authorities, whose expertise is not in determining public policy.     
147 The government of a democratic South Africa.  
148 Smit C “The Rationale for Competition Policy: A South African Perspective”. Paper read at the 
biennial Economic Society of South Africa Conference, 7-9 September 2015, Elangeni Holiday Inn, 
Durban, Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa 1. Last accessed 01 July 2019 at: https://econex.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/econex_researcharticle_10.pdf.  
149 Ibid.  
150 Lewis D “Competition Regulation: The South African Experience” Paper presented at ISCCO 2000 
Conference, in Taipei. 
151 Own emphasis added.  
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Africans to compete in the international markets. All these objectives form a 
part of the public interest considerations.  
 
The arguments for the inclusion of the public interest considerations in merger 
evaluation seem to centre on the history of inequality and economic exclusion,152 as 
well as the rampant levels of unemployment.153 This centre, given that law is said to 
be a dynamic phenomenon whose focus is influenced by prevailing political 
dispensations and socio-economic imperatives,154 ipso facto is well grounded. The 
past whence South Africa hails cannot be ignored in enacting as well as interpreting 
laws. This past, in line with constitutional imperatives, calls for a contextual, 




From a purely economic perspective, the competition considerations alone should 
suffice as the yardstick for merger analysis. However, from a socio-economic 
perspective, it also makes sense to include the public interest considerations in 
merger analysis. For balance, the Act juxtaposes merger evaluation upon both 
factors. Striking a balance between the two complex amalgams of considerations, 
which are sometimes at war with one another, may not be an easy task.  
 
Proponents of the public interest considerations, on the one hand, posit that, 
because of South Africa’s long history of exclusion and marginalisation, the merger 
regime should be cognisant of this historical fact. They contend that the preamble to 
the Act as well as its objectives are instructive on the kind of merger regime we 
                                            
152 In its “Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: An Assessment of Drivers Constraints 
and Opportunities” Report, published in March 2018, The World Bank named South Africa as the 
country with the worst inequality.  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/530481521735906534/pdf/124521-REV-OUO-South-
Africa-Poverty-and-Inequality-Assessment-Report-2018-FINAL-WEB.pdf (accessed on 01 July 2019).   
153 Stats SA currently estimates unemployment in South Africa at 27.6%, the highest in the world. 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?s=unemployment+rate&sitem=content (accessed on 01 July 2019).  
154 Brooks PEJ “Redefining the objectives of South African competition law” 2001 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa vol 34:3 296. 
155 I deal with the relevant statutory tools of interpreting legislation within the context of sec 12A of the 
Act in Chapter 3 below.    
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should have – being a generous one which gives effect to public interest 
considerations. They argue that any developing country which fails to cater for social 
justice and transformatory needs in its competition law remit, may easily be 
discredited by the larger public. 
   
On the other hand, antagonists of the public interest considerations submit that, 
competition law, and merger control in particular, should be about the maintenance 
and promotion of competition and economic efficiencies. They contend that the 
promotion and maintenance of competition should be the primary determinant, and 
that non-competition factors will inevitably take care of themselves, as long as 
competition thrives. 
  
Both ends of this rod are sensible, providing competition authorities with a difficult 
choice to make. How these are then harmonised to ensure an effective and balanced 



















CHAPTER 3: FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PUBLIC 




In the South African context, merger evaluation is juxtaposed on a bilateral test of 
competition and public interest considerations.156 The competition authorities,157 
enjoined with applying this bilateral test, face an onerous task often imbued in 
conflicting sentiments. On the one hand, they face steadfast opprobrium from big 
businesses and analysts, who are averse to the idea of public interest 
considerations, when giving heed to the public interest considerations in merger 
analysis.  Paradoxically, the competition authorities in the same providence, face 
manifest commendation from the trade unions and the general public. On the other 
hand, where the competition authorities prefer a more competition-based approach 
to merger analysis, the inverse is true as regards the sentiments from the different 
stakeholders. These sentiments find more traction owing to the fact that the 
legislature does not elucidate on which consideration, competition or public interest, 
should take precedence when there is conflict.158  The question that is then the cloth 
upon which this chapter is pegged is: what happens where – as here – the Act does 
not provide guidance on what approach to follow when these two equally important 
legal determinations conflict?  
 
The focus of this chapter is to analyse some of the most contentious and seminal 
merger cases decided by the competition authorities. The analysis is aimed at 
showing the approach preferred by the competition authorities in deciding which, 
between the competition and the public interest considerations, takes precedence 
when there is conflict between the two.  
                                            
156 Sec 12A(1) & (3) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
157 Reference to ‘the competition authorities’ in this work refers to the Competition Commission, the 
Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court, either separately or joint. 
158 Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (66/LM/Oct01) [2002] ZACT 13 (22 
February 2002) at para 38. 
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3.2. Brief background: the ambiguity in section 12A of the Act 
 
As previously stated, section 12A(1) of the Act states that: “whenever required to 
consider a merger, the Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal must 
initially determine whether or not the merger is likely to substantially prevent or 
lessen competition”159 The Act then goes further to provide that, despite the outcome 
of its competition determination, the authorities must determine “whether the merger 
can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds”.160  
 
What the Act omits to address is how, in case of conflict, the competition 
considerations and the public interest considerations should be tallied. Put 
differently, which of the two considerations or test should take precedence in the 
event of conflict. It is worthwhile to note that merger analysis has not been short of 
such conflict as regards the two legal tests. Below I deal with case analysis to 
illustrate some instances where conflict between the two tests was visible. 
  
3.3. Case analysis   
3.3.1. Metropolitan Holdings Ltd v Momentum Group Ltd 
 
In Metropolitan Holdings Ltd v Momentum Group Ltd161 the Competition Tribunal 
conditionally approved the merger between two public companies, which provide 
insurance cover to their clients and also offered financial services. The Competition 
Tribunal found that the merger did not raise any competition concerns as neither the 
evidence nor the Competition Commission’s market investigation found that the 
merger is unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition.162 Moreover, the 
Tribunal also found that the merger would result in more efficiencies, such as 
                                            
159 Sec 12A(1) of the Act which goes further to enumerate certain competition factors to be considered 
in merger analysis, which factors are not relevant for the purpose of this study. 
160 Sec 12A(1)(b) & 12A(1A) of the Act.  
161 (41/LM/Jul10) [2010] ZACT 87 (9 December 2010). 
162 Metropolitan-Momentum [52] & [60].  
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enhanced growth opportunities, cost synergies and economies of scale.163 From a 
competition perspective, this merger is textbook pro-competitive.164   
  
As mandated by the Act, the Tribunal also had to consider the public interest issues 
arising from the merger. The Tribunal found that the merger gave rise to only one 
public interest concern – employment. The merging parties estimated that the 
merger may result in one thousand (1000) retrenchments. This estimated number of 
retrenchments was found to be “substantial” and it was proposed that the merger 
must then pass the hurdle of being justified in terms of this concern to either be 
approved (conditionally) or prohibited.165 The Tribunal found that where a prima facie 
public interest ground has been alleged, the burden of proof shifts to the merging 
parties to prove that the public interest concern can be justified.166 The Tribunal 
propounded the following test:   
“The evidential burden that the parties must meet, once the prima facie case has 
been established, must satisfy two criteria namely that: 
1. a rational process has been followed to arrive at the determination of the number 
of jobs to be lost, i.e. that the reason for the job reduction and the number of jobs 
proposed to be shed are rationally connected; and 
2. the public interest in preventing employment loss is balanced by an equally 
weighty, but countervailing public interest, justifying the job loss and which is 
cognisable under the Act.”167  
 
The Tribunal further explained that despite the merging parties having made a good 
efficiency argument for the loss of substantial jobs, the efficiency gain must 
nonetheless be justified on a ground that is public in nature – even those public 
grounds not mentioned in the Act – to countervail the public interest in the 
preservation of jobs.168 The efficiency gains, the Tribunal found further, must 
therefore be of a public rather than a private nature. This presupposes that, 
                                            
163 Metropolitan-Momentum [71]. 
164 Despite the competition challenges raised, the merger would not likely prevent or lessen 
competition in any relevant potential market. The industry in which the parties operated had other 
large competitors, such as the merging parties, and smaller competitors, thus making the industry 
evenly spread-out. These other larger and smaller competitors would exercise a competitive 
constraint on the merged entity. – [41]-[42].  
165 Metropolitan-Momentum [100]. 
166 Metropolitan-Momentum [68]. 
167 Metropolitan-Momentum [70]. 
168 Metropolitan-Momentum [71] et seq. 
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notwithstanding the plethora of efficiency gains to be accrued to, for instance 
shareholders, at the expense of substantial job losses, the justification of such job 
losses must be grounded upon a public consideration to countervail the job losses. 
Therefore, the cutting of costs resulting from a merger thereby benefiting 
shareholders through increased dividends  as an efficiency, fails to meet the public 
interest standard as such a motive is intended for private gain rather than for a public 
gain. The Tribunal found that the merger fails to satisfy the first leg of the criteria 
propounded above in that there is no rational link between the job losses and the 
efficiencies sought to be achieved.169  Alternatively, if the merging parties have 
satisfied the first leg of the test (which they did not), the Tribunal found that the 
parties failed to show any public interest that would justify the job losses.170 
 
Although the merging parties did not justify the substantial employment loss, the 
Tribunal found that the employment losses do not justify the prohibition of the 
merger.171  As a means to ameliorate the potential job losses, the merging parties 
had planned to redeploy, retrain and offer early retirement packages for the affected 
employees.172 The Tribunal found that this was not adequate under the 
circumstances and imposed a moratorium on employment.173 The moratorium stated 
that the merged entity “shall ensure that there are no retrenchments in South Africa 
resulting from the merger for a period of 2 (two) years”.174 Thus, the Tribunal 
preferred an interpretation that saved the merger on its positive competition 
considerations rather than prohibit it based on its adverse effects to the public 





                                            
169 Metropolitan-Momentum [92]. 
170 Metropolitan-Momentum [100]. 
171 Metropolitan-Momentum [117]. 
172 Metropolitan-Momentum [79].  
173 Metropolitan-Momentum [102].  
174 Metropolitan-Momentum [120] & at Annexure “A2”of the consolidated order.  
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3.3.2. Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited & Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery 
Group Ltd  
 
In Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited & Stellenbosch Famer’s Winery Group Ltd,175 
Distillers Corporation intended to acquire the assets and liabilities of the 
Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery Group (SFW), including the latter’s shareholding in 
some companies.176 This acquisition, in competition terms, translated to a merger. 
Both these firms operated in the production and wholesaling of alcoholic 
beverages.177 The parties contended that the rationale for the merger is that the 
merger will lead to increased efficiencies that will enhance international 
competitiveness.178 They substantiated this contention by arguing that, but for the 
merger, “neither company could afford the intensive marketing strategies nor 
effectively manage the supply and distribution of alcoholic products overseas.”179 
The Tribunal found that in respect of four categories of identified alcohol markets, in 
three of those markets, the merger will not result in a substantial lessening or 
prevention of competition.180 In respect of the third market, the proprietary spirits 
market, the Tribunal found that the merger will likely lessen or prevent competition 
on the evidence that the merger will likely result in significant barriers to entry in this 
market.181  
 
The merging parties raised public interest grounds, which justify the implementation 
of the merger. These public interest grounds are those in subparagraphs (a) and (d) 
of section 12A(3).182 The intervening unions relied on the effect of the merger on 
employment as a ground to prohibit the merger.183 In respect of the quagmire 
resulting from the conflict between the competition and public interest 
                                            
175 (08/LM/Feb02). 
176 Ibid [10]. 
177 Ibid [[3] & 4]. 
178 Ibid [19]. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Ibid [169], [194] & [207]. These are in respect of the Flavoured Alcoholic Beverages, value spirits 
and premium spirits markets.  
181 Ibid [198] & [202]. 
182 These public interest grounds are those of the impact of a merger on – (a) a particular sector or 
industry; and (d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.  
183 Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited supra [213].  
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considerations, and the conflict amongst the public interest grounds, the Tribunal 
stated the following:  
“Thus the public interest asserted pulls us in opposing directions. However, the 
legislation expressly allows for this. Just as the legislation may allow the public 
interest to resurrect a merger that will harm competition it also contemplates a 
situation where a public interest ground may justify the prohibition of a merger even if 
a merger does not have an anticompetitive effect.”184 
 
In striking a balance between the conflicts, the Tribunal stated that the language of 
the provision is instructive; adding that the wording “…otherwise, determine whether 
the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest grounds by 
assessing the factors set out in subsection (3)” is consistent with both a balancing 
approach and a reconciliation approach.185 The Tribunal found that the number of 
jobs affected by this merger was estimated to be 1 414, with 630 people who have 
accepted voluntary retirement and with 621 who have accepted voluntary 
retrenchment, and a remainder of 164 people to be forcibly retrenched.186 The 
Tribunal found that although the job losses were significant, the prodigious 
acceptance of voluntary retrenchment and retirement packages has reduced the 
adverse effects, and on balance, the remaining effect on employment did not 
constitute a substantial public interest ground justifying the prohibition of the 
merger.187 The Tribunal remarked in obiter that it did not need to evaluate the 
parties’ public interest claim, because it would not alter the outcome of its finding on 
the competition criteria. The Tribunal stated that the public interest claims advanced 
by the merging parties aimed at resurrecting the merger already approved on 




                                            
184 Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited supra [214]. 
185 Ibid [218] & [219]. 
186 Ibid [227]. 
187 Ibid [243].  
188 Ibid [246]. 
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3.3.3. Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Competition Commission and 
Glencore Internation PLC & Xstrata PLC   
 
I discuss these two separate mergers together for reasons that will self-eventuate 
further below in the discussion. In Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Competition Commission, In re: Aon South Africa Glenrand MIB Ltd189 the 
Competition Tribunal approved the merger between the two merging parties subject 
to conditions. The merger was between Aon South Africa and Glenrand MIB, both 
firms conducting business as short-term insurance brokers and risk advisory.190 It 
was perspicuous that the transaction was not likely to prevent or lessen competition, 
therefore, calling for no competition analysis.191 Albeit the transaction did not present 
any competition concerns, the analysis on the public interest concerns raised by the 
transaction warranted analysis for purposes of this chapter. 
 
The merger had a substantial negative impact on employment. Approximately, 220 
employees out of 1500 (which constituted about 15% of the merged entity’s 
workforce) was to be retrenched as a result of the merger.192 The parties contended 
that the reason for the potential retrenchments was, inter alia, that there would be 
duplication of roles at certain senior and executive management positions.193 The 
parties, upon further evaluation, came to a number of retrenchments lower than the 
initial one and thereby lower number of redundancies.194 However, the Tribunal still 
narrowed the number of employees to be retrenched, despite this lowered estimate. 
The Tribunal imposed a condition that the merged entity will not dismiss any 
employee earning less than R15 000 per month and that there will be no 
retrenchments of more than 24 employees earning between R15 000 and R30 000 
per month, for a period of two years resulting from the merger.195  
 
                                            
189 (37/AM/Apr11) [2011] ZACT 100 (24 November 2011). 
190 Ibid [7].  
191 Ibid [1].  
192 Ibid [8] & [9].  
193 Ibid.  
194 Ibid [16]. 
195 Ibid [28].  
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In Glencore Internation PLC & Xstrata PLC196 the Competition Tribunal conditionally 
approved the merger between the parties. The primary acquiring firm was Glencore 
which provides services relating to natural resources, and has activities in, inter alia, 
the mining, smelting, refining and processing of metals.197 The primary target firm 
was Xstrata, which is involved in the production of coal, ferrochrome, vanadium, and 
copper, amongst others.198 The parties submitted that the rationale for the proposed 
transaction was that the transaction was a combination of two complementary 
businesses with ancient links.199 Further, the transaction will lead to enhanced scale 
and market positions in the production and marketing of key commodities.200 
   
The Tribunal found no cogent evidence that the proposed transaction would likely 
substantially prevent or lessen competition in the relevant market. The merger, 
however, raised employment concerns.201 To mitigate the possible employment 
harm, the Tribunal imposed a condition that no more than 80 semi-skilled employees 
may be retrenched, and in respect of semi-skilled and unskilled employees, the 
merging parties must conduct a review whether the retrenchment of these classes of 
employees is required, and if so, the merged entity may only retrench them two 
years after the end of the review; and that no more than 100 employees of this class 
may be retrenched as a result of the merger forever.202 This is notwithstanding the 
duplication of positions already pleaded by the parties.203 
 
Although the conditions in both cases were in relation to the public interest, they 
nonetheless affected the merged entity’s aptitude to compete effectively – more so 
because the mergers were found to not likely lessen or prevent competition. Balkin 
and Mbikiwa proffer that the conditions imposed would render the merged entities 
uncompetitive “because it forced it [the merged entities] to maintain an inefficient 
                                            
196 (33/LM/Mar12) [2013] ZACT 11 (6 March 2013). 
197 Ibid [27].  
198 Ibid [31].  
199 Ibid [35]. 
200 Ibid.  
201 Ibid [96].  
202 Ibid [99] & [100].  
203 Ibid [96].  
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employee base at a much greater cost than its rivals.”204 The authors then question 
whether the decision to impose such conditions was appropriate.205 They further 
submit that not all jobs warrant saving if regard is had to the substantial impact in the 
context of the South African economy, as doing so may be irreconcilable with 
broader competition objectives.206    
 
3.3.4. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & SABMiller Plc  
 
In 2016, the Competition Tribunal conditionally approved the large merger between 
the largest beer company in the world and the second largest beer producer on a 
global scale, in the case of Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & SABMiller Plc (“AB 
InBev”).207 No doubt, a merger between two firms of such gargantuan status globally, 
will attract the attention of all relevant regulators in the countries in which the firms 
operate.208 Both these firms were in the market of manufacturing beverages, but 
more pertinent to the merger, was the manufacturing of clear beer and flavoured 
alcoholic beverages (“FAB”).209   
 
The first competition concern that the Tribunal had to grapple with is the likelihood of 
the increased market share that the merged entity would enjoy post-merger in 
respect of the beer market. To mitigate this possibility, the merging firms undertook 
to divest certain SABMiller brands in South Africa, which collectively account for 
1.4% of the market share in South Africa.210 In turn, the merging party was estimated 
                                            
204 Balkin J & M Mbikiwa “Balancing Competition Act: paradox” 2014 Business Law and Tax Review 
2. 
205 Chapter 2 above discusses substantiality in more detail, as propounded by the Competition 
Tribunal in Wal-Mart & Massmart case.  
206 Balkin & Mbikiwa above. 
207 LM211Jan16 [1].  
208 SABMiller is an iconic manufacturing firm in South Africa which operates in over 75 countries. 
Therefore, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is founded on the basis that SABMiller has interest in the South 
African beverages manufacturing market – [9]. Another ground for jurisdiction is that the acquiring 
firm, Anheuser-Busch InBev, distributes beer products in South Africa although with a miniscule 
market share – [12].  
209 AB InBev supra [10]. 
210 Ibid [12].  
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to gain a market share of 0.1%, thus diminishing rather than enhancing its market 
presence.211  
 
The Tribunal stated that the challenge with the divested and gained market shares is 
that there is a projection of what market share might be gained in the medium 
term.212 The Tribunal found that the projection of possible market share to be gained 
is premised on untested assumptions, and found that in the clear beer market, the 
merger is unlikely to lead to an increase in the merged firm’s market share.213 It 
seems to me, on the one hand, prudent to err on caution’s side and state that the Act 
does not prohibit dominance – only its abuse – thus, the divestment of some market 
share in return of lesser market share, is a consideration that is at odds with the Act. 
This is so because the divestment condition aims to reduce the merged entity’s 
dominance.  Assuming, on the other hand, that dominance in the form of increased 
market share was likely to lessen or prevent competition, the Tribunal misdirected 
itself in accepting that the projected market share to be gained is “insufficiently 
probative”.214 I buttress this submission by likening it with the following illustration: 
when a Goliath join arms with another Goliath, it is the Davids that stand to suffer;215 
therefore, to curtail this suffering, the consortium between the two Goliaths must be 
prohibited, or hatched about with stern conditions.216    
          
In contrast to the beer market, the Tribunal found that the merger does not lead to a 
substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the FAB market.217 The Tribunal 
based this finding on the basis that SABMiller, being the largest player in the local 
                                            
211 Ibid [17].  
212 Ibid [18].  
213 Ibid [19].  
214 Ibid [18].  
215 This is notwithstanding the rather ironic and improbable turn of events in the metaphor. 
216 My submission is based on the fact that it is inevitable that the merged entity’s market share will 
increase, thus the increased probability of market foreclosure in this sector. To avoid this, there are 
two extremes available. Firstly, prohibit this merger with the possibility of a counter-factual to the 
merger being that AB InBev may be a potential competitor of SABMiller in South Africa. The Tribunal 
found that the Competition Commission in its market inquiry did not consider this possibility despite a 
document by AB InBev tantalising with the possibility – [15]. This should have been probed further. 
Whether such a possibility was real or superficial, remains moot at this point because this would have 
required further assessment. Secondly, impose stricter conditions to ensure that the possibility of 
market foreclosure does not result because of the merger. The divestment condition is, with respect, 
simply not sufficient.       
217 AB InBev supra 21. 
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FAB market, will, post-merger, as per the divestiture, have reduced economic 
interest in this market.218 Furthermore, AB InBev is also a producer of highly 
renowned FAB products which, if introduced in the local market will make the FAB 
market more competitive.219 I agree with this finding, as it allows the local FAB 
market to be more competitive – especially with the divestment – allowing firms 
which were subsidiaries of SABMiller to trade independent of SABMiller. This 
promoted healthy competition and ensures a widespread of participation in the local 
FAB market. 
 
The second competition concern was that the merger could lead to import 
substitution of inputs at the peril of local industry.220 The other one is that the merged 
entity sources all available inputs from the local industry to support its international 
operations, thus forcing local competitors to source inputs from more expensive 
suppliers.221  
    
The merger raised public interest concerns which can be properly classified as falling 
under section 12A(3)(b) and (c) of the Act.222 As a measure to alleviate these public 
interest concerns, the parties undertook to invest two billion one hundred million rand 
on transformation.223 Although the competition authorities are conferred with the 
power to approve a merger subject to any conditions,224 such conditions must not be 
unrelated to the merger, or must not protect interests that do not stem from the 
merger.225  
 
                                            
218 Ibid 20.  
219 Ibid.  
220 Ibid 26. This is because the combined buying power of the merged entity and AB InBev’s extensive 
procurement network, could lead to inputs being obtained more cheaply from international suppliers.  
221 Ibid.  
222 These public interest concerns are the impact of a merger on employment and, the ability of small 
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In my opinion, the merger should not have been approved, or if so approved, subject 
to stricter competition conditions. The failure by the Competition Commission and 
subsequently the Tribunal, to probe further into the counterfactual that the parties 
may be potential competitors is staggeringly odd. In Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited & 
Transvaal Suiker Beperk226 the Tribunal stated that merger analysis is concerned 
with the plausible counterfactual of potential competition between the merging 
parties, and that this consideration “complies with the standards established by the 
Act”.227 The conditional approval of this merger shows three things. Firstly, that the 
competition considerations rank higher than the public interest considerations in that 
the merger was approved on competition terms despite the substantially adverse 
findings on public interest. Secondly, that instead of prohibiting a merger based on 
its negative public interest effects, it is far much better to approve it and cushion the 
negative effects on public interest with the imposition of conditions – no matter how 
ominously burdensome and overreaching. Lastly, approving the merger on 
competition terms and challenges, as are present in the case, with such lax 
competition conditions, shows a preference for competition considerations.  
      
3.3.5. Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited & Transvaal Suiker Beperk 
 
In Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited & Transvaal Suiker Beperk228 the Tribunal 
prohibited the merger between the parties. The merger was between Tongaat-Hulett 
Group (THG), being the acquiring firm and the second largest sugar producing 
company in South Africa.229 The target firm was Transvaal Suiker Beperk (TSB), 
which was the third largest sugar producing company in South Africa.230 Both these 
firms are in the sugar producing industry. The Tribunal found that the merger would 
result in the merged firm having market power, and that it was likely to prevent or 
lessen competition in the South African sugar market.231 The merging parties raised 
the defences of technological, efficiency and other pro-competitive gains as 
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offsetting the anti-competitive effect of the merger.232 The Tribunal found that the 
defences raised, properly measured against the negative effect of the merger on 
competition, do not offset the anti-competitiveness of the merger and must therefore 
fail.233 
 
The remaining question for determination was whether the merger can or cannot be 
justified on substantial public interest grounds. The merging parties entered a public 
interest defence under all the categories of the listed grounds.234 Amongst others, 
the merging parties averred that due to its large economies of scale and 
opportunities, the merged entity would be in a position to expand its operations and 
therefore create employment opportunities of over 3000 additional jobs.235 Further, 
the parties contended that the merger would benefit the region of Mpumalanga as 
the parties undertook to continue to procure their inputs of their Mpumalanga 
operations from local suppliers, and that they would sell a portion of TSB’s 8000 
hectares of land to historically disadvantaged communities.236 Despite these 
benignly positive effects to the public interest, the Tribunal found that they are not 
“sufficiently substantial to countervail the negative impact of the merger on 
competition”.237 This finding goes a long way to show that despite the most positive 
effects of a merger on the public interest, the role of the public interest remains 
secondary to that of the competition considerations238 – and that a merger that is 
“perfectly bad” for competition, cannot be saved by its positive impact on the public 
interest.  
       
3.3.6. Walmart Stores Inc & Massmart Holdings Limited 
 
The Walmart Stores Inc & Massmart Holdings Limited239 (“Walmart-Massmart”) 
merger case was described as one of the seminal cases on public interest 
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considerations in the history of merger analysis in South Africa.240 The acquiring firm 
was Walmart, the largest retailer in the world, operating in over fifteen countries. The 
target firm was Massmart, which trades across the African continent. It is 
perspicuous that the merger did not raise any competition concerns.241 Several 
parties including trade unions and government departments (“the government”) 
intervened in the proceedings to raise the public interest grounds, which would be 
affected by the merger. The public interest considerations pertinent in this case were 
the effect of a merger on a particular industrial sector or region, employment and the 
ability of small businesses or firms owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to 
become competitive. 
 
Before the merger, an estimate of 503 Massmart employees were retrenched. It was 
argued on behalf of the unions and the government that the job losses were in 
anticipation of the merger and therefore occurred as a result of the merger. This, it 
was argued, was because of the closeness of the timing of the retrenchments and 
the negotiations to merge; meaning, there was sufficient nexus between the two 
events. The merging parties, however, argued that the retrenchments occurred as a 
result of Massmart’s operational requirements and had nothing to do with the 
merger. 
 
At the time of the negotiation between the two parties, Walmart was also considering 
to merge with other African retailers. However, Walmart could only merge with one of 
them and not all of them. In the due diligence report done by Walmart, it was 
revealed that Walmart would prefer a Massmart with a smaller employee base.242 
The Tribunal had to consider the argument that Massmart would have downsized 
pursuant to the merger so as to entice Walmart – leading to 503 job losses. In finding 
that the two events were not related, the Tribunal stated thus:  
“But it seems unlikely that given the total size of the Massmart labour force – about 
26 500 – that this figure of 503 affected employees would prove material in 
persuading Walmart that Massmart was a sweeter prospect than its rivals. Whilst it is 
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true that some of the due diligence reports done by Walmart … might suggest that 
Walmart would prefer a leaner Massmart, there is nothing to suggest the former’s 
hand in the latter’s earlier retrenchments.”243  
 
The merger also raised a competition concern in that the merged entity would 
procure services of Asian manufacturers. The unions and the government argued 
that because of Walmart’s global procurement network, procurement of local 
producers would suffer at the peril of lower cost Asian producers. It was argued on 
behalf of the merging parties that the competitors in South Africa are relatively large 
and some are larger than Massmart. For this reason, the competition concern of 
procurement from local suppliers for international suppliers with the possibility to gain 
market power, was gainsaid. The Competition Tribunal made a finding to this effect 
as well.244   
  
Applying the provisions of section 12A of the Act, the Tribunal stated that “subject 
matter and substantiality are not the only limitations in considering the public 
interest”; as an addition to these, the public interest consideration must be merger 
specific.245 The Tribunal stated that since the Act came into being, no anti-
competitive merger has ever been rescued by the public interest, and that no merger 
with adverse public interest has prohibited a ‘pro-competitive’ merger.246 The 
Tribunal maintained that this did not render the public interest useless; rather, the 
authorities have thought it adequate to impose conditions to address the adverse 
public interest findings. The Tribunal remarked that the public interest mandate is 
linked to its competition inquiry and that the two are analysed with regard to each 
other, but does not go as far as a balancing exercise as required with the efficiency 
analysis.247  
    
To avert the job losses post-merger, the Tribunal imposed a condition that the 
merged entity must ensure that there are no retrenchments based on operational 
reasons in South Africa for a period of two years after the effective date of the 
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merger.248 Preceding this, the Tribunal stated that a further limitation to the public 
interest is that the public interest concern must be merger specific.249 The imposition 
of the employment condition is, in my view, at odds with this limitation. The Tribunal 
agreed with the merging parties’ argument that no jobs would be lost as a result of 
the merger post-merger. The employment condition was therefore non sequitur, 
unless its imposition is to ensure and indeed safeguard its finding. Be it as it may, 
the employment condition comes across as a conflict with the Tribunal’s own dictum 
that public interest concern must be merger specific.  
 
Given Walmart’s notorious anti-union approach, SACCAWU submitted that its 
position as the largest union representative of Massmart’s employee base would be 
affected by the merger and made further submissions to ensure that its position is 
not affected by the merger. Alert to this concern, the Tribunal further imposed a 
bargaining condition, which ensured that the merged entity does not, inter alia, 
challenge SACCAWU’s position as the largest representative union of its workers to 
represent the bargaining unit for a period of three years.250 It is important to note 
that, section 3 of the Act clearly states that: 
3. Application of Act 
“This Act applies to all economic activity within, or having an effect within, the 
Republic, except – 
(a) collective bargaining within the meaning of section 23 of the Constitution,      
and the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995); 
(b) a collective agreement, as defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations    
Act, 1995.”251 
Firstly, the Act explicitly excludes collective bargaining from its ambit, which means 
the Tribunal’s imposition of the unionisation condition is at odds with the Act’s scope 
of application.  Secondly, the labour laws of South Africa make provision for union 
representation and how this should be addressed within the labour scheme.252 
‘Employment’ refers to exactly that and not to the negotiation and representation of 
bargaining deals as the unions are intended for.  Finally, it is not within the remit of 
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the competition authorities to make such a condition because there is no law 
empowering them to do so, instead, there is law – section 3 of the Act – against 
doing so. Therefore, in my opinion, the Tribunal acted ultra vires in imposing the 
condition. As a result, the Tribunal’s imposition of a bargaining condition was an 
unacceptable overstretch of the public interest inquiry.253 
 
The government took the Tribunal’s decision on review to the Competition Appeal 
Court (CAC).254  The CAC set aside the decision of the Tribunal, although not in its 
entirety. Here I consider those parts of the Tribunal’s decision which were upheld by 
the appeal court and which are relevant to this study. Pertinently, the CAC grappled 
with the application of section 12A, when the competition and public interest 
considerations conflicted. It noted that on a holistic reading of the Act, it is possible to 
argue that if the merger is not likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, 
the competition authorities must still proceed to consider the public interest 
enquiry.255 The CAC stated that this approach is seemingly compatible with the 
wording of the provision. The CAC further stated that the public interest 
considerations in deciding whether to approve the merger must be analysed 
distinctly. The CAC also made  remarks on how the Act fails to provide guidance on 
how much weight is to be attached to the public interest inquiry, and how the 
relationship between the competition factors in section 12A(2) are regulated as 
against the public interest grounds. In my view, the weight of the public interest must 
be considerable because the public interest must be ‘substantial’ to refuse a merger 
that is found to not lessen or prevent competition. However, since there has not been 
such a merger which has resulted in its refusal solely on its adverse public interest 
effect, the public interest do not weigh as considerably as the competition 
considerations. 
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Buttigieg submits that the competition authorities, in the interests of “consumers and 
society” should err on the side of approving rather than preventing a merger.256 The 
CAC endorsed this principle, but warned that this should be done in a strict 
manner.257 The CAC concluded that unless the effect on the public interest 
contained in section 12A(3) is proven to be substantial, the authorities cannot 
employ the public interest inquiry to prohibit the merger.   
 
3.4. Striking a balance between competition and public interest 
considerations  
 
The balance, it is suggested, lies in that law is a dynamic phenomenon whose focus 
is influenced by prevailing political dispensations and socio-economic imperatives.258 
This proposition strikes at the heart of the argument that the public interest analysis 
is misplaced. A transformative legal system ought to recognise the prevailing norms 
of society and adjust according to the prevailing norms and needs at the time.259 The 
current legal and political needs of South Africa warrant that the public interest be a 
part of merger analysis. The gnawing need for economic transformation is an 
indication to go by. 
 
In Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd260 the Tribunal stated 
that the competition authorities play a secondary role in its public interest 
intervention.261 The rationale for this is that there are other specialised institutions 
whose primary mandate is to advance the public interest. Secondly, the Tribunal 
stated that when competition is unimpaired, the competition authorities should curtail 
their scope of intervention.262 I agree with this approach. Hodge, Goga and Moahloli 
submit that in merger fillings, parties do not concede an anticompetitive effect of a 
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merger to argue a substantive public interest to justify such anti-competitiveness.263 
The authors further posit that the Tribunal in Shell South Africa has interpreted the 
public interest in a way that accords with their initial inclusion in the Act, and in a way 
that is consistent with achieving a balance between the competition and public 
interest considerations.264 The authors base their submission on mainly three 
reasons. The first is premised on Lewis’ assertion that merger review in emerging 
countries must recognise the public interest in their regime for credibility purposes – 
but “that credibility is lost either if public interest dominates most decisions or is 
ignored in its entirety”.265 Secondly, the public interest considerations are directly 
served by competition itself, and that their consideration in merger review is 
secondary.266 Finally, although there is no “good” merger that has been prohibited on 
its negative public interest, public interest considerations do not dominate in a vast 
majority of merger cases. This is so because the public interest can be cured by the 
imposition of conditions so as to achieve the balance between the public interest and 
competition considerations.267  
In Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Gold Fields Limited268 the Tribunal 
stated that in balancing the considerations, the competition considerations take 
priority.269 The Tribunal stated that this prioritisation of the competition inquiry is 
explained by the use of the word ‘justification’ in the public interest inquiry.270 It was 
further stated that although the public interest inquiry may lead to a conclusion that is 
opposite to the competition one, such a conclusion will be justified with regard to the 
competition one and not in and of itself.271 Put simply, the public interest inquiry is 
not made in isolation of the prior competition test. To this effect, the Tribunal 
succinctly held that:  
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“Yes, it is possible that a merger that will not be anti-competitive can be turned down 
on public interest grounds, but that does not mean that in coming to the conclusion 
on the latter, one will have no regard to the conclusion on the first. Hence section 12 
A makes use of the term “justified” in conjunction with the public interest inquiry. It is 
not used in the sense that the merger must be justified independently on public 
interest grounds. Rather it means that the public interest conclusion is justified in 
relation to prior competition conclusion.”272 
 
The wording of section 12A (1) instructs the competition authorities to “initially 
determine” the competition question and “then determine” the public interest 
question. This was interpreted in Harmony as meaning that the merging parties are 
not required to positively justify a merger on the public interest grounds. In 
Metropolitan Holdings Limited and Momentum Group Limited,273  the Tribunal 
extended the interpretation in Harmony as meaning that the merging parties only 
have an evidential burden to rebut a prima facie allegation of a substantial effect to 
the public interest grounds, if and when such an allegation is made. The effect of this 
is that if, on the facts before the competition authorities, there is no allegation of the 
public interest grounds being fraught, the authorities may dispense with the matter 
based on the competition test alone. This interpretation is warranted by section 12A 
of the Act. Moodaliyar and Roberts submit that while the public interests are 
contained in the Act, their role is to “supplement a standard competition enquiry”.274 
Thus, the public interest is not a standalone inquiry; its application depends on the 
competition inquiry. 
 
Balthasar suggests that the fact that section 12A(1) starts off with the competition 
considerations, should point out that the competition considerations take priority.275 
Balthasar further points out that this position is guided by the use of the word 
“initially” when referring to the competition analysis. The author is, however, quick to 
point out that this principal position is not irrefutable. Hartzenberg rightly posits that 
despite the Act’s wealth of objectives, in the end economic efficiency takes centre 
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stage.276 Roberts points out that economic efficiency is the overriding principle, and 
that the public interest only play a secondary and supplementary role.277   
 
As stated earlier, since the Act was enacted, no merger was prohibited based on the 
public interest considerations alone. Instead, the authorities imposed conditions to 
ensure that the public interest considerations are not vexed by the approval of a 
merger.278 It is correct that in some instances the authorities have let the “pendulum” 
to swing “too far in the direction of the public interest”.279 However, this is no matrix 
to go by in balancing the conflicting interests. The correct approach is the one 
articulated above.   
 
In essence, the competition test should take precedence when the two 
considerations are at war, for the reasons above. Moreover, I should hasten to 
submit that we must shun upon using the public interest inquiry in merger analysis to 
cure South Africa’s social and economic woes. The role of the competition 
authorities is “not to make the world a better place, only to prevent it becoming worse 
as a result of a specific transaction”.280 Social and economic concerns which can be 
properly canvassed at forums or institutions whose primary mandate and expertise is 
to remedy such concerns, must be addressed at such forums and not by the 
competition authorities. However, competition authorities should also not be 
dismissive in dealing with public interest concerns which properly fall within their 
remit. The balance is to be found in whether the Act permits or prohibits certain 
intervention into the public interest.  
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It is submitted that the “pendulum has swung too far in the direction of public 
interest.”281 This may be correct considering that the authorities have, in some 
instances, imposed conditions which are not part of the listed public interest grounds 
to safeguard the public interest considerations.282 Such cases do not illustrate how 
the competition considerations and the public interest considerations should be 
balanced in case of a conflict. Such cases are bad in law and should therefore not 
serve as reference to the overriding inquiry of this study.  
 
The competition test should take precedence when there is conflict with the public 
interest test. Section 12A of the Act although not expressive of this, is couched in 
such terms that it warrants this interpretation. The primary concern of competition 
law and the primary role of the competition authorities is competition. Although the 
Act introduces concerns outside the competition law scheme, the authorities’ 
intervention as regards such concerns has been correctly laid out as being 
secondary. This does not, however, mean that the authorities must shy away from 
inquiring and deciding on such non-competition factors. It simply means that the 
competition authorities must assert their scope of intervention to the extent permitted 
by the Act. Therefore, this justifies the approach that the competition considerations 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF THE 2018 COMPETITION AMENDMENT ACT ON 
THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
COMPETITION CONSIDERATIONS IN MERGER CONTROL 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
It is accepted that the Competition Act (“the Act”)283 was enacted partly to eradicate 
persisting structural inequalities in the South African economy.284 After 20 years of 
the enforcement of the Competition Act, it became clear that the objective of the Act 
to address inequalities in the Country, could not be fully achieved under the Act 
without giving the competition authorities some added powers and responsibilities. 
Thus, in response to this, the Competition Amendment Act (“the Amendment Act”)285 
which came into effect on the 06th of July 2019,286 was enacted. The Amendment Act 
was enacted to, inter alia, give the authorities added powers and responsibilities, 
with the objective to address “concentration and the racially-skewed spread of 
ownership of firms in the economy”.287  
 
The Competition Amendment Bill, 2017, which gave rise to the Amendment Act 
asserted that, “[t]hese amendments seek to ensure evidence-based inquiry into and 
explicit scrutiny of concentration when [amongst others] mergers are considered… 
The amendments permit the competition authorities to undertake far-reaching and 
targeted interventions to address concentration.”288 The amendments, the Bill stated 
further, are also aimed at providing scrutiny of the racially-skewed spread of 
ownership in the economy. Therefore, in order to achieve these added objectives, 
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the provision of the Competition Act relating to mergers, amongst others, must be 
strengthened.289 
The Amendment Act came with added responsibilities for competition authorities, 
some of which relate to public interest considerations in mergers. Thus, this bears 
the potential to impact on how competition and public interest considerations are 
evaluated in merger regulation. The raison d’être for this chapter is therefore to 
consider the effect of the Amendment Act on how the conflict between public interest 
and competition considerations in mergers is to be managed.  
 
As stated in the preceding chapters, merger evaluation in terms of section 12A of the 
Competition Act (“the Act”),290 is juxtaposed upon two considerations – competition 
and public interest considerations. In terms of the provision, the competition 
authorities must determine the effects of a merger on both considerations. It is also 
trite that these considerations sometimes conflict. The provision is, however, reticent 
on how to resolve such a conflict whenever the two considerations conflict.  As 
evinced in chapter three above, competition considerations take antecedence when 
in conflict with the public interest considerations. This, however, does not mean that 
public interest considerations are less important, as compared to competition 
considerations. Both considerations are important, but when in conflict, competition 
considerations have generally taken priority with the view that public interest 
concerns can be cured with conditions. 
 
Following the promulgation of the Amendment Act, it may be appropriate to consider 
whether, when conflict between public interest and competition considerations arise, 
competition considerations will continue to be prioritised over public interests. In 
addressing this question, it is apposite to consider, briefly, the background to the 
promulgation of the Amendment Act. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Competition Amendment Bill, 2017,291 the objects of the amendments are stated, 
among others, as to address “the high levels of economic concentration in the 
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economy and skewed ownership profile of the economy”.292  These objects are to be 
achieved through, amongst others, providing special attention to merger regulation in 
particular by giving prominence to some public interest issues.293  
 
The Explanatory Memorandum explains that the amendment to section 12A, which 
deals with the evaluation of mergers, adds requirements that consideration be given 
to cross-shareholdings and cross-dictatorship by merging parties, so as to address 
the problem of concentration. 294 The amendments also add a requirement that the 
merging parties disclose their merger activity engaged in the preceding three 
years.295 This is also aimed at identifying markets in which creeping concentrations 
may occur. Further and more fittingly, the amendments intend to explicitly create 
public interest grounds in merger evaluation to address ownership, control and the 
support of small businesses and firms owned or controlled by historically 
disadvantaged persons.296 
  
4.2. Section 12A of the Competition Act, as amended by section 9 of the 
2018 Competition Amendment Act  
 
As a preface, it is prudent to quote section 12A(1) of the Act prior the amendment in 
order to distinguish it from the position under the amended provision. Section 12A(1) 
of the Act before the amendment read as follows: 
“12A. Consideration of Mergers. 
Whenever required to consider a merger, the Competition Commission or 
Competition Tribunal must initially determine whether or not the merger is 
likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, by assessing the factors 
set out in subsection (2), and – 
 
(a) if it appears that the merger is likely to substantially prevent or 
lessen competition, then determine – 
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(i) whether or not the merger is likely to result in any 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive 
gain which will be greater than, and offset, the 
effects of any prevention or lessening of 
competition, that may result or is likely to result 
from the merger, and would not likely be obtained if 
the merger is prevented; and 
 
(ii) whether the merger can or cannot be justified on 
substantial public interest grounds by assessing the 
factors set out in subsection (3); or 
  
(b) otherwise, determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified 
on substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors set 
out in subsection (3).”297  
 
From the above, it is clear that the provision was perspicuous on how merger 
analysis was to be carried out. Firstly, the authorities had to initially determine 
whether the merger was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition based 
on the listed competition considerations. Secondly, if the merger was likely to 
substantially prevent or lessen competition, the authorities had to determine whether 
the merger was likely to lead to any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive 
gains which would offset the anti-competitiveness and which would not occur but for 
the merger. Thirdly, dependent on the competition test, the authorities had to 
determine whether such a merger could or could not be justified on substantial public 
interest grounds. Finally, the authorities had to determine, separate from the 
competition test, whether the merger could or could not be justified on substantial 
public interest grounds. The distinction between the two public interest 
considerations, under section 12A(1)(a)(ii) and 12A(1)(b), was significant and 
therefore requires more elucidation.  
    
In terms of section 12A(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, the public interest test was dependent on 
the competition test. The public interest analysis under this provision is used to 
harmonise or reconcile the competition test with the public interest test. The 
Guidelines on the assessment of public interest in merger regulation under the 
                                            
297 Own emphasis added.  
58 
 
Competition Act (“the Guidelines”)298 issued by the Competition Commission, state 
that in the first public interest inquiry, under section 12A(1)(a)(ii), the finding on 
competition grounds must be negative.299 Following from this negative finding, the 
Commission must determine whether there are any substantially positive public 
interest grounds justifying the otherwise anti-competitive merger.300 This means an 
anti-competitive merger may be approved based on its positive benefits to the public 
interests.301  
 
The public interest inquiry under section 12A(1)(b), on the other hand, stems from or 
occurs regardless of a positive competition finding. This means that the Commission 
is required to determine whether an otherwise good merger from a competition 
perspective raises any substantially negative public interest effects.302 In Anglo 
American Holdings Ltd and Kumba Resources Ltd,303 the Competition Tribunal 
stated that the effect of the word “otherwise” in section 12A(1)(b) means that the 
public interest evaluation must nonetheless be undertaken, regardless of the 
outcome of the competition evaluation.304 Therefore, this means the public interest 
evaluation in this provision must be undertaken even where competition is 
unimpaired. The effect of this is that the public interest evaluation in this provision 
may permit an anti-competitive merger and conversely prohibit a pro-competitive 
merger.305 
 
Section 12A has since been amended by section 9 the Amendment Act. Following 
the amendment, subsections (1)(a)(ii) and (1)(b) have been replaced by the new 
subsections (1)(b) and (1A), respectively. The wording of subsection (1)(a)(ii) has 
been retained in the new subsection (1)(b) in its previous form and has the same 
substantive effect. The new subsection (1A), which amends subsection (1)(b), has 
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adopted a different wording. The subsection provides that “despite” the 
determination in subsection (1) – being the competition test – the competition 
authorities must also determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified on 
substantial public interest grounds. Prior to amendment, subsection 1(b) of the Act, 
as quoted above, used the word “otherwise”. The difference between the two 
subsections is that one uses the word “otherwise” and the other uses the word 
“despite”. The word otherwise means “in another manner” or “in other respects”.306 
Whereas the word despite means “in spite of”.307 The Tribunal has interpreted the 
word otherwise in context, as meaning regardless of the competition analysis, the 
public interest analysis must still be carried out.308 This interpretation is inextricably 
consistent with the meaning of the newly used word – despite. Save for the semantic 
difference in the subsections, I do not find any cogent reason to conclude that there 
are substantive differences between the two words. If the contrary was intended, the 
legislature would have made that intention perspicuous. Therefore, this difference in 
wording does not alter the interpretation that public interest considerations play a 
secondary role, and that competition considerations take priority when in conflict with 
the former in merger analysis. 
 
Irvine correctly submits that the new section 12A does not alter the previous position 
already developed by the Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court in 
some of the cases already discussed in chapter 3.309 She further adds that the 
amended section 12A “appears largely to codify the existing approach to weighing 
up competition and public interest considerations”, rather than developing or 
amending it.310 She further points out that the Explanatory Note to the Amendment 
Act does not place any onus on the parties to prove that their transaction benefits 
either competition or public interest considerations.311 By necessary implication, this 
means that the position prior to amendment – where parties ground their proposed 
transaction on competition considerations rather than public interest considerations, 
                                            
306 Dictionary.com www.dictionary.com/browse/otherwise (accessed: 04 July 2020). 
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and only relying on the latter to supplement their argument on the former – 
prevails.312   
   
Section 12A(3) of the Act, prior to amendment, enumerated four public interest 
grounds upon which the public interest evaluation had to be grounded. It enlisted the 
effect of a merger on “a particular industrial sector or region;313 employment;314 the 
ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged 
persons, to become competitive;315 and the ability of national industries to compete 
in international markets.316” Added by the Amendment Act to this list of public 
interest factors, is the effect of a merger on “the promotion of a greater spread of 
ownership, in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically 
disadvantaged persons and workers in firms in the market.317 The addition of this 
factor is immaterial on how the conflict between competition and public interest 
considerations should be resolved.   
 
4.3. Recent merger cases decided after the 2018 Amendment Act  
 
In chapter 3 the observation made is that competition considerations take 
antecedence when in conflict with public interest considerations in merger 
evaluation. However, this finding did not factor in the impact of the 2018 Competition 
Amendment Act. In this part, I make an attempt to consider some merger cases 
decided after the Amendment Act came into force, with a view to assess the impact 
of the Amendment Act on how the balance is to be struck between competition and 
public interest considerations when the two are in conflict.  
 
In 13 August 2019, the Competition Tribunal conditionally approved the merger 
between British American Tobacco Holdings South Africa (Pty) Ltd & Twisp (Pty) 
                                            
312 Hodge J, Goga S & Moahloli T “Public Interest Provisions in the South African Competition Act: A 
Critical Review” 2009 Competition Policy, Law & Economics Conference 9-10. 
313 Sec 12A(3)(a) of the Act. 
314 Sec 12A(3)(b) of the Act. 
315 Sec 12A(3)(c) of the Act. 
316 Sec 12A(3)(d) of the Act. 
317 Sec 12A(3)(e) of the Act. 
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Ltd.318  The acquiring firm, British American Tobacco (BAT), manufactures, markets 
and distributes cigarettes in South Africa.319 The target firm, Twisp, supplies a variety 
of vaping products as well as e-cigarettes.320 The rationale for the merger, inter alia, 
was that there was substantial potential for growth for vaping products and e-
cigarettes, which makes the transaction an investment.321 It was noted that suppliers 
of cigarettes compete for, amongst others, shelf space from retailers.322 It was found 
that Twisp is the dominant supplier of e-cigarettes in South Africa.323 The 
Competition Commission, in its market inquiry, found that BAT has a market share of 
over 60% of the South African cigarette market.324 This meant that BAT has market 
power to influence the amount of shelf space retailers should allocate it.325 The 
Tribunal found that this potentially exclusionary conduct by BAT may be used to 
foreclose competition in both the cigarette and e-cigarette markets.326 The Tribunal 
ultimately approved the merger subject to strenuous behavioural conditions.327 
     
The Tribunal found that the merger raises the public interest concern of 
employment.328 During the merger process, BAT had intended to retrench a number 
of its employees. BAT subsequently withdrew the retrenchments notices because of 
indications of the economy recovering and that government indicated that it would 
deal with the illicit sale of cigarettes.329 Despite this, a moratorium on employment 
was imposed for a period of two years. 
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pandemic and government-imposed regulations to curb the spread of the pandemic, the economy fell 
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Although the Tribunal imposed adequate conditions to address the serious 
competition concerns, it nonetheless implicitly used the public interest inquiry in 
section 12A(1)(b) to determine whether the otherwise anti-competitive merger was 
justifiable on public interest considerations. The finding on this basis was to the 
affirmative. Of course, this is by no means an indication that the merger was 
approved based on it being justifiable on public interest grounds. In fact, it is quite 
the contrary. Despite the merger having conspicuously grievous competition 
concerns, the Tribunal still opted to save the merger rather than prohibit it. The 
conditions imposed are, in my view, adequate but potentially improbable to realise 
and monitor successfully. This is why prohibition would have been much easier. This 
is an indication that competition considerations – whether correctly considered or not 
– have a slight advantage in the final decision making. 
 
In Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Others & The remaining gold mining 
South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd330 the Competition Tribunal 
unconditionally approved the merger between the parties. The acquiring firms were 
Harmony Gold Mining Company together with its wholly owned subsidiaries 
(“Harmony gold”),331 which operates in the mining, production and exploration of gold 
and silver across South Africa.332 The target firms were the remaining gold mining 
South African operations of AngloGold Ashanti (“AngloGold”), which operates in the 
mining, production and exploration of gold and silver.333 The Tribunal found that the 
rationale for the proposed transaction was that the transaction aligns with 
AngloGold’s disposals of its gold mining assets in South Africa, and that Harmony 
Gold stood to acquire strategic gold fit assets.334 
 
The Tribunal found a horizontal overlap in the supply of gold and silver in the 
international markets.335 In the international market for the supply of gold, the 
                                            
330 LM/171/Mar20 [1].  
331 Harmony Moab Khotsong Operations (Pty) Ltd and Golden Core Trade & Invest (Pty) Ltd. These 
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Tribunal found that the merged entity would have about 1.7% of the market post-
merger.336 The Tribunal again found that in the international market for the supply of 
silver, the merged entity would have about 0.3% of the market share post-merger.  
The Tribunal concluded that “the merged entity would continue to face competitive 
constraints from a highly fragmented market as no participant’s market share 
exceeded 10%” in both the supply of gold and silver. In the result, the Tribunal found 
that the merger is not likely to prevent or lessen competition in either of the markets. 
 
The merger raised several public interest concerns. The first being of employment. 
The Tribunal imposed a moratorium of 12 months on retrenchments resulting from 
the merger.337 The second public interest concern was the greater spread of 
ownership of historically disadvantaged persons. In this regard, the Tribunal found 
that because both Harmony Gold and AngloGold are both JSE-listed companies, 
with Harmony Gold’s shareholding at group level being +30% B-BBEE, this would 
result in a greater spread of ownership and increased levels of ownership by 
historically disadvantaged persons.338 As a result, the Tribunal concluded that no 
public interest concerns arise from the proposed merger.  
 
From this merger, there appears to be no deviation following the Amendment Act 
from how the competition and public interest considerations were weighed against 
each other prior to the amendment. This merger is also an example of how to apply 
the new public interest factor introduced by section 12A(3)(e), which refers to a 
greater spread of ownership and increased levels of ownership by historically 
disadvantaged persons. 
  
In Emerging African Property Partners (Pty) Ltd & Lisaline Investment Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd339 the Competition Tribunal approved the merger between the two parties 
pursuant to the amended Act. On the competition inquiry, the Tribunal found that the 
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merger was not likely to prevent or lessen competition in the relevant market.340 It 
further found that the proposed merger resulted in a “pro-public interest” benefit. The 
public interest benefit was that a black-owned women-empowerment company will 
be partnering with the Government Employees Pension Fund. This public interest 
benefit, by necessary implication, falls squarely under the new subsection (3)(e) of 
section 12A. As a result, the merger was approved unconditionally. Again, it cannot 
be reasonably construed that the Tribunal deviated from the erstwhile position of 
weighing the competition and public interest considerations against each other.  
     
Owing to the fact that the Amendment Act came into effect only recently, the real 
impact of the new amendments are yet to be fully determined. Some of the merger 
cases decided following the Amendment Act seemed so straightforward that they did 
not warrant any lengthy or detailed analysis. The decision making process has 
generally followed a familiar pattern established before the Amendment Act. As a 
result, the cases discussed above which were decided following the amendment of 
the Act do not indicate a departure from the position established prior to the 
amendment of the Act. Although this assertion may not be completely reliable, as 
only a few cases are discussed above, the legislative language used in the 
Amendment Act also does not suggest a departure from the practice established 
before the Act was amended.   
 
4.4. Conclusion  
 
The Amendment Act is laden with increased emphasis on public interest 
considerations. This emphasis is especially more pronounced in merger control. 
Despite this, the Amendment Act does not alter the established practice that in 
merger evaluation, competition considerations take precedent when in conflict with 
public interest considerations. This observation is grounded on evidence borne out 
from the text of the Act before and after the amendments. The new section 12A of 
the Act does not differ materially or in substance with the provision before it was 
amended. Accordingly, despite heightened attention to public interest issues in the 
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Amendment Act, competition considerations still take precedence when in conflict 
























CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The advent of democracy in South Africa necessitated that the structure of the 
economy, with high concentration levels and racial inequality in terms of economic 
participation, had to be reconsidered.341 The new economy had to be open to 
address economic participation of historically disadvantaged persons and to 
integrate them in the economy.342  These issues needed to be dealt with urgently 
and effectively.343 It was also recognised that these issues would be best-addressed 
by a variety of economic and social policies, particularly those relating to trade and 
industry, with competition policy being an important part of the interventions 
envisaged.344 Apart from the traditional concerns of competition law and economic 
inequality, this envisaged competition policy would also address employment 
interests within its remit.345 Thus, such non-competition interests are known as public 
interest considerations, and they form an integral role in competition regulation. 
 
There is no doubt that the Competition Act (“the Act”)346 was enacted largely to 
address the past injustices.347 The Preamble to the Act stands as testament. Of 
particular importance to this study is how the Act regulates mergers.348 The Act 
enjoins the competition authorities to initially determine whether or not the merger is 
likely to substantially prevent or lesson competition.349 The next step is to determine, 
if the merger is likely to impact negatively on competition, whether the merger is 
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likely to result in any efficiency gains.350 Finally, the authorities must determine 
whether such a merger can nevertheless be justified on substantial public interest 
grounds.351 The bilateral test of competition and public interest considerations in 
merger analysis may be thought of as the state’s needed intervention to bridge the 
gap between competition policy, on the one hand, and socio-political imperatives, on 
the other.  
 
How these tests are applied in practice is an interesting pedagogy. In terms of the 
competition test, the authorities must compare the competitiveness of markets in the 
absence of the merger to the likely competitiveness of markets post-merger.352 The 
assessment in the latter inquiry requires the authorities to hypothesise on whether 
consumers would be harmed (as a result of higher prices and reduced product 
choice) if the merger were approved.353 The authorities must also determine whether 
a merger found to be anticompetitive, may be justified by efficiency gains which 
offset the likely anticompetitive effect of the merger, and which would not be possible 
were it not for the merger.354  
 
The second part of this evaluation is the public interest inquiry. On the one hand, 
section 12A(1)(b) requires the authorities to determine whether, based on the 
competition inquiry, the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public 
interest grounds. On the other hand, Section 12A(1A) provides that the authorities 
must, independent of the competition test, determine whether such a merger may be 
justified on substantial public interest grounds. The Act enumerates the public 
interest grounds upon which the merger should be measured. These are the effect of 
a merger on: “a particular industrial sector; employment; the ability of small 
businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to 
become competitive; the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets; and the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular to 
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increase the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and workers 
in firms in the market.”355 
Although public interest considerations are unlikely to trump on an otherwise pro-
competitive merger, as evinced from chapter 3, a substantial amount of time and 
effort is put by parties into whether a merger is justified on substantial public interest 
grounds.356 The Competition Amendment Act357 was introduced in response to calls 
that the competition authorities needed sharper teeth in prosecuting competition law 
cases. The impact of this amendment on mergers – especially for the purpose of this 
work – is rather limited. Section 9(e) of the Amendment Act states that “despite” the 
competition inquiry, the authorities must still determine the impact of a merger on 
public interest grounds. Substantively, this is not a departure from the replaced 
section 12A(1)(b), which provided that the authorities must “otherwise” determine the 
impact of a merger on substantive public interest grounds. If anything, the two carry 
the same meaning substantively. The only difference is a semantic difference in the 
form of wording.358 As a result, the Competition Amendment Act does not alter the 
position that competition considerations take priority when in conflict with public 
interest considerations.359 
      
The Act explicitly provides that the authorities “must initially determine” the 
competition question and thereafter determine the public interest question.360 In 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd & Gold Fields Ltd,361 the Tribunal stated that this 
prioritisation of the competition inquiry explains the word “justification” in regard to 
the public interest, and further explains why the public interest inquiry is justified not 
in and of itself, but with regard to the competition inquiry.362 In Anglo American 
                                            
355 Sec 12A(3) of the Act.  
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Holdings Ltd & Kumba Resources Ltd363 the Tribunal stated that the public interest 
“can operate either to sanitise an anticompetitive merger or to impugn a merger 
found not be [sic] anticompetitive”.364 This effectively means that an anticompetitive 
merger may be approved on its positive effect to the public interest, and vice-
versa.365 To this day, no merger has been approved solely on its positive effect to 
the public interest in contrast to its anti-competitiveness. 
  
5.2. The public interest considerations: is this necessary in competition 
policy?  
  
There are steadfast contestations on the rightfulness of the public interest 
considerations in both competition law, in general, and merger review, in particular. 
On the one side of the spectrum are those who contend that public interest should 
not be part of competition policy. Reekie warns that relying on competition policy to 
foster socio-economic objectives is “inappropriate” because the competition 
authorities are ill-suited to compare the complex polycentric considerations at 
play.366 The author adds further that the competition authorities lack the institutional 
expertise to deal with such polycentric issues; there are institutions properly 
constituted for this very purpose.367 On the other side of the spectrum are those who 
advocate for the inclusion of public interest in competition policy. They posit that the 
inclusion of the public interest is government’s effort to meet the gnawing need of 
South Africa’s redistributive justice.368 They further argue that the credibility of any 
competition law regime, especially that of developing countries, relies on its ability to 
address “those issues that most engage popular sentiment”, being the public 
interest.369 
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I think both arguments are valid. However, I am indisposed to agree with those who 
argue against the public interest. This argument is grounded mainly on constitutional 
imperatives. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”) is perspicuous on the need for transformation and enjoins the state to 
take legislative and other measures towards the achievement of this goal.370 The 
Constitutional Court affirmed this and stated as follows in South African Police 
Service v Solidarity obo Barnard: 
“Remedial measures may exact a cost our racial history demands we recognise.  The 
Constitution permits us to take past disadvantage into account to achieve substantive 
equality. But it does so generous-heartedly and ambitiously: it licenses reparative 
measures designed to protect or advance all persons who have been disadvantaged 
by any form of unfair discrimination.  For reasons of history, racial and gender 
disadvantage are the most prominent.”371     
   
Thus, the recognition of the public interest considerations in merger analysis under 
the Act, constitutes a “legislative measure” under section 9(2) of the Constitution to 
ensure that there is reparative justice for the unfair and discriminatory laws of the 
past. The lack of economic participation by the vast majority of South Africans is due 
to apartheid and its marginalisation laws. Therefore, to account for this, public 
interest considerations in mergers are part of the reparative measures echoed by the 
Constitution. The position of the public interest in competition policy is therefore 
grounded on constitutional tenets.  
 
5.3. Balancing the competition and public interest considerations  
 
Despite the guidance of section 12A on how to assess a merger, the provision 
leaves moot the question which, between the competition and public interest 
considerations, take antecedence when the two conflict. The focal purpose of this 
study ultimately is to assess which between the competition and public interest 
considerations take precedence when they conflict. The finding of the study is that 
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when balancing the two considerations, the competition considerations take primacy. 
In Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Gold Fields Limited the Tribunal 
asserted that the public interest inquiry is not an independent inquiry; it does not 
exist in and of itself independent of the competition inquiry.372  The Tribunal stressed 
that the wording of the provision should be instructive; adding that the words “initially 
determine” as regards the competition test, and “then determine” as regards the 
public interest, are instructive as to which between the two should take 
precedence.373  The Tribunal found that the public interest need not be justified in 
and of itself, but must be justified in conjunction with the competition 
considerations.374 
 
In Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd & Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd, the Tribunal stated that 
the role of the public interest is secondary to that of the competition 
considerations.375 This expression finds support from Hodge and others, who submit 
that the public interest plays a supplementary role in merger analysis.376 They 
correctly contend that the parties do not concede the anti-competitiveness of 
mergers to argue the positive impact to the public interest. Although a bad merger 
may be sanitised by the public interest, it will not ultimately depend on the public 
interest whether to prohibit or approve such a merger. This may be evinced by the 
case of Tongaat-Hulett Group Limited & Transvaal Suiker Beperk where the Tribunal 
prohibited an anti-competitive merger despite its many positive impact to the public 
interest considerations.377 This is another indication that the public interest 
considerations play a secondary role, and that when in conflict with the competition 
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5.4. Recommendations  
 
To this day, not a single merger has ever be prohibited solely on its negative effect 
on the public interest. Instead, the authorities have cushioned such negative effects 
to the public interest with conditions. It is precisely such conditions which, in most 
cases – as seen from the foregoing chapters, have attracted opprobrium on the 
basis that they are overreaching and thus show an unwarranted elevation of the 
public interest. While these arguments may be correct, they do not reveal the 
balance between the public interest and competition considerations. The authorities, 
conscious of this concern, should not overreach in their imposition of the public 
interest conditions. This has the potential to discredit their interpretation of the 
balance between the public interests and competition considerations.  
 
The jurisprudence on balance exists but not to such a degree that is perspicuous or 
copious. This potentially leads to misperception and misinterpretation. Therefore, to 
alleviate this, it would be judicious to frequently restate the position. This will assist in 
cementing the overarching burden and concern of which between the public interest 
and competition considerations take precedence when the two are in conflict.  
 
The objectives of the Act are vocal on transforming the erstwhile exclusive economy 
inherited from apartheid to become inclusive.  However, to this day the economy is 
still similar to that which the Act initially sought to transform.378  The 2018 
Amendment Act is seen as a deliberate furtherance of the initial objectives, in that 
the Amendment Act proposes more effective measures to address this economic 
calamity.379 Although the Amendment Act places more emphasis on public interest 
considerations, this alone is not enough to achieve its objectives – particularly those 
of transformation. Much needs to be done. Competition policy can only go so far. In 
a politically dynamic country such as South Africa, where politicians are law and 
policy makers, this political dynamism should extend far beyond lobbying for votes, 
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to also using political power to adopt more inclusive and radical policies in other 
sectors to realise the ultimate goal of transformation.  
             
5.5. Conclusion 
 
While it is correct that competition demands rivalry,380 a balanced regulation of this is 
also important, as it guides against over-enforcement and under-enforcement. In a 
system where over-enforcement prevails, the obvious consequence is that there is 
less flexibility, resulting in strict conditions for firms to conduct their businesses. On 
the other hand, under-enforcement may result in big businesses creating higher 
barriers to entry, thus denying smaller businesses the platform on which to compete. 
A balanced regulation ensures that neither the latter nor the former prevail, and 
where the latter prevails, consequences are meted against the offending party.  
 
This balanced regulation is also important as regards merger analysis on whether 
the public interest considerations or the competition considerations should take 
precedence when they conflict. The scenery of regulation in general above, shows 
that competition in itself imbue the public interest without the need for directly relying 
on the public interest to determine a merger. Therefore, it is correct that the 
competition interests take antecedence when in conflict with the public interest 
considerations. It is also correct that the position of the public interest in both 
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